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NOTES AND COMMENTS
9

Constitutional Law-Price Fixing-Power of State Legislature
to Fix Charges of Ticket Brokers.
The constitutionality of legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth
Amendment has again been presented in a case1 recently decided by
the New York Supreme Court. A New York statute providing for the
regulation of ticket brokers limited their charges to a maximum of
seventy-five cents on each ticket. The court held that Tyson v. Banton,2
in which a similar law had been held invalid, had been in effect (though
not explicitly) overruled by a later -decision of the United States SulKelly-Sullivan v. Moss, 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 491 (Sup. Ct., 1940).
'273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927).
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preme Court in Nebbia v. New York,3 in which the state's power to
regulate the price of milk was upheld; and that under the rule of the
Nebbia case price legislation was constitutional if it had a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose. The court said 4 that the enactment could be defeated as violative of due process only if plaintiffs
established that "no evils existed in connection with the sale of tickets,
. . .or, if the evils existed, that the remedy adopted by the legislature
was arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory." An application for a
temporary injunction was denied, and appeal has been taken.
For a considerable time the price-fixing power of a state was limited to businesses "affected with a public interest". This doctrine was
introduced into the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Munn v. Illinois,5 upholding an Illinois statute fixing the maximum
charges for the storage of grain. The phrase was derived from an essay
of Lord Hale, De Portibus Maris: "When private property is 'affected
with a public interest', it ceases to be juris privati only." The court
found that a "virtual monopoly" existed; the owners stood in the "gateway of commerce" and were enabled to exact a toll from the public.
From these facts, it followed that they had devoted their property to a
public use, thereby granting the public an interest in that use, and -that
they were subject to regulation to the extent of that interest.
The same line of reasoning was followed in Budd v. New York; 7
but in Brassv. Stoeser,8 likewise upholding a statute limiting the charges
of grain elevators, the element of monopoly was lacking and economic
conditions were markedly different. The basis of that decision seems
to have been that a business once found to be affected with a public
interest remained so, although some of the distinguishing characteristics which had been originally used to justify the classification were
absent.
Insurance was held to be a business affected with a public interest,
although no public use of property was involved, in German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis.9 A broad interpretation was given to the principles of Munn v. Illinois. Contracts of insurance, the court pointed out,
were interdependent, affected a large portion of the public, and were of
great public concern. Insurance was "essentially different from ordinary commercial transactions". Important also in the court's consideration was the fact that prices were fixed by schedules, and that therefore
liberty of contract might be said to be illusory. The monopolistic ele'291

U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934).

5 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876).
'
See note 1, supra, at 500.
6 1 HARG. LAw TRACTS 6 (1787) ; Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 759.

"143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, 36 L. ed. 247 (1892).
' 153 U. S.391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857, 38 L. ed. 757 (1894).
' 233 U. S.389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L. ed. 1011 (1914).
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ment was present, but the opinion seems to imply that the police power
may operate to control contract prices where exercised to promote the
general welfare.10
In Block v.Hirsch," the first of a series of war emergency rent
cases,' 2 the power of Congress to fix rents for a limited period in the
District of Columbia was upheld on the ground that the normal competitive system had broken down, and that the exigency had clothed the
letting of buildings with a public interest so great as to justify regulation while such exigency existed.' 3
So far, the concept of affectation with a public interest had been
used to justify price legislation; but in Charles Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of IndustrialRelations'4 the -doctrine was applied to hold a Kansas statute regulating wages in the meat packing industry in violation of
due process. Businesses affected with a public interest were limited to
three categories: (1) Where a franchise has been granted, with an
affirmative duty of rendering public service. (2) Exceptional occupations long subject to such regulation, such as innkeepers and cabmen.
(3) Those businesses, not public in their inception, which have come
to bear such a peculiar relation to the public that they can be said to
have been devoted by their owners to a public use, in effect granting
the public an interest in that use, and subject to regulation to the extent
of that interest. The court found that in nearly all the businesses hitherto held to come under the third classification, the public had an interest because of the "indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant
charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected
without regulation."' 5 The court admitted that it was difficult under
the cases to lay down a working rule; but the determining factor was
always the nature of the business. The nature of the meat-packing industry was not such as to bring it within the third category, and the
state had no power to restrict the freedom of contract of employer and
employee.
" 233 U. S. at 409, 34 Sup. Ct. at 618, 58 L. ed. at 1020 (1914) : "Against that
conservatism of the mind, which puts to question every new act of regulating
legislation and regards the legislation invalid or dangerous until it has become
familiar, government-state and national-has pressed on in the general welfare. . . . The dread of the moment having -passed, no one is now heard to say
that"1256
rightsU.were
restrained
their
S.135,
41 Sup.orCt.
458,constitutional
65 L. ed. 865guaranties
(1921). impaired."
2
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65
L. ed. 877 (1921) ; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S.543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405,
68 L. ed. 841 (1924).
13 256 U. S. at 155, 41 Sup. Ct. at 464, 65 L. ed. at 870: "Plainly circumstances
may so change in time or so differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what
at other times or in other places would be a matter of urely private concern."
See Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 E. ed. 755, holding valid
emergency wage legislation of the federal government.
11 262 U. S.522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. ed. 1103 (1923).
1Id.at 538, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634, 67 L. ed. at 1109 (1923).
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The exact nature of this determining factor was not made clear; it
was not said what created the "peculiarly close relation" between the
business and the public. The rule was thus stated in the negative:
"One does not devote one's property or business to the public use or
clothe it with a public interest merely because one makes commodities
for, and sells to, the public in the common callings. .

. ."16

Beyond

reference to previous examples of business where price regulation had
been held permissible, the case seems to furnish no definitive test, except
that the element of monopoly must be present.
There followed a series of decisions based on the rule as laid down
in the Wolff case, holding wage fixing and price fixing legislation unconstitutional.17 The theory which had been formulated to uphold price
regulation was now used to invalidate it. In each of these cases, with
the exception of Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,' 8 in which there was one
dissent and two concurrences in result only, the court was seriously
divided. The majority opinions expressed the principle, rigidly interpreted, that liberty of contract is the rule, and restraint the exception,
particularly with regard to price fixing since price is the "heart of the
bargain". An examination of the minority views reveals that the identical rules are applied to reach contrary results. The difference lies in
the approach to the basic economic problem.
Criticising the majority opinion in the Tyson case, 19 Justice Stone
first points out that the decision is broader than necessary to determine
the question presented. The question is not whether the theatre business is a prioriaffected with a public interest, but whether the criterion
Id. at 537, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633, 67 L. ed. at 1109 (1923).
Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1923), holding a general wage fixing statute applicable to women in the District
of Columbia invalid, was decided just prior to the Wolff case. Decided subsequently were: Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718
(1927) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S.350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. ed. 913 (1927);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S.235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73 L. ed. 287 (1929);
cf. New State Ice Co. v4 Liebmann, 285 U. S.262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. ed. 747
18

17

(1931).

In b'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51
Sup. Ct. 130, 75 L. ed. 324 (1930), the fixing of insurance agents' commissions
was allowed as a regulation of a business already declared within the category
of those affected with the requisite public interest. Cf. Brass v. Stoeser, supra,
note 8. It had already been held that a state may regulate the relations of those
engaged in the insurance business. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S.465, 39
Sup. Ct. 160,-63 L. ed. 362 (1918); see Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 277 U. S. 311, 320, 48 Sup. Ct. 512, 515, 72 L. ed. 895, 899 (1927).
18 See note 17, supra. Price regulation of gasoline industry was held
invalid.
The state seems not to have made a sufficient showing of the necessity for and
reasonableness of the regulation, which may explain the concurrences of Justices
Brandeis and Stone in the result.
" Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927).
The
Court held that the theatre business was essentially a private business, though
subject to forms of regulation other than price fixing under the police power; and
that theatre ticket brokers were an appendage of the theatre business, and their
charges could therefore not be regulated.
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of public interest, as developed in the earlier cases and applied to the
situation under consideration-the activities of ticket brokers-shows
those elements present which were the basis of the right to fix prices in
former cases. The inquiry is whether there are circumstances restricting
the regulative force of competition so that "serious economic consequences result to a very large number of members of the community."
He concludes that the solution of the problem "turns upon considerations of economics about which there may be reasonable differences of
opinion. Choice between these views takes us from the judicial to the
legislative field. The judicial function ends when it is determined that
there is basis for legislative action in a field not withheld from legislative power by the constitution as interpreted by the decisions of this
Court.

'20

Justice Stone's dissent in Ribnik v. McBride,21 in which a New Jersey statute regulating charges of employment agencies was held invalid, 22 adds a further criticism of the prevailing view: "I cannot accept
as valid the distinction on which the opinion of the majority seems to
me necessarily to -depend, that granted constitutional power to regulate
there is any controlling difference between reasonable regulation of
price, if appropriate to the evil to be remedied, and other forms of appropriate regulation. . . . I can see no difference between a reasonable
of the use of property,
regulation of price and a reasonable regulation
23
which affects its prices or economic return.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,24 said: "The notion of a distinct category of business 'affected
with a public interest' employing property 'devoted to a public use' rests
upon historical error. The consequences which it is sought to draw from
those phrases are belied by the meaning in which they were first used
centuries ago, and by the decision of this Court, in Munn v. Illinois, ...
which first introduced them into the law of the Constitution. In my
opinion, the true principle is that the State's power extends to every
regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the
public protection."
- 273 U. S. at 454, 47 Sup. Ct. at 436, 71 L. ed. at 733 (1927).
" See note 17, supra.
" In Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 36 Sup. Ct. 561, 60 L. ed. 1034 (1915)
the Court held that reasonable regulation of employment agencies was permissible,
but did not consider the validity of a provision limiting charges. In Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. ed. 1336 (1916) the Court held invalid a Washington statute forbidding agents to receive fees from workers, on
the ground that it operated to destroy a legitimate business, although fees could
be charged to the employers.

-'3277 U. S. at 373, 48 Sup. Ct. at 552, 72 L. ed. at 923 (1927).
24285 U. S. at 302, 52 Sup. Ct. at 383, 76 L. ed. at 766 (1931). The Court held
invalid a statute making a certificate of public necessity and convenience a prerequisite to engaging in the business of manufacturing and distributing ice.
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The majority opinion in the Nebbia25 case is in consonance with
these views. The statute involved gave a Milk Control Board power to
fix minimum and maximum prices for milk,26 and was based explicitly
on a legislative finding of an emergency. While the court discussed the
facts in support of this finding, it did not base its holding of constitutionality on the authority of the rent cases 27 and Wilson v. New, 28 but
chose rather to make a clean sweep of the old rule and to lay down a
broad new one.
Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority, said: "The thought
seems to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct
about the prices . .. and that, however able to regulate other elements
of manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is
incapable of directly controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago."129 Reverting to the original application of the
"public interest" rule to interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
in Munn v.Illinois,0 the court found that it was there understood to
mean that "'affected with a public interest' is the equivalent of 'subject
to the exercise of the police power' . ."1 Therefore, with regard to
price regulation, as well as other regulation of business under the general police power: "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
32
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied."
The standard indicated in the Nebbia case is no more than the expression of the empirical approach in empirical language. The phrase
"affected with a public interest", drawn out of its original context and
firmly associated in the Wolff and following cases with categorical limitations based on a priori concepts of the "nature of a business", could,
as seen in Justice Stone's -dissents, have been applied empirically to
reach the same result; but the court chose to discard, with the categories, the language that was used to justify them, and to restate the
standard in terms that eliminate entirely the old logistic ritual of
rationalization.
In subsequent cases price regulation both by states 33 and by the fed"See note 3, supra.
"' The Board fixed a minimum to be paid to producers and a minimum to be

charged to consumers, thereby in effect setting a maximum charge for the services
of intermediaries between the producer and the public.
" See notes 11 and 12, supra.
28 See note 13, supra.
291 U. S. at 532, 54 Sup. Ct. at 514, 78 L. ed. at 954 (1934).
20 "Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner
to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large." 94 U. S. at
126, 24 L. ed. at 84 (1876).
21291 U. S. at 533, 54 Sup. Ct. at 514, 78 L. ed. at 954 (1934).
2
-Id.at 537, 54 Sup. Ct. at 516, 78 L. ed. at 957 (1934).
22
1egeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup. Ct. 7, 79 L. ed.
259 (1934); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S.251, 56 Sup.
Ct. 453, 80 L. ed. 669 (1936); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S.

218"
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eral government 4 has been upheld, on the authority of the Nebbia
decision.
Tho plaintiff in the instant case, to obtain a ruling of unconstitutionality, mut show that no conditions exist in the ticket brokerage
business which would justify regulation in the public interest; or that,
if they do exist, price regulation as a remedy does not bear a reasonable relation to the correction of those conditions, or is arbitrary or
discriminatory.
As to the existence of evils arising through unrestricted sale of
tickets, the New York court said that "not only has the legislature
pointed to the evils, but the courts have furnished bills of particulars
of them."35 The court pointed to the fact that, under an agreement
with the League of New York Theatres, Inc., nearly all New York
theatre ticket brokers have voluntarily limited their charges, as further
evidence of the necessity of regulation. There would seem to be little
question, certainly, about the opportunity for exploitation of the public,
since about ninety-five per cent of amusement tickets sold in the metropolitan area pass through the hands of brokers.
If the court finds that conditions are such as to justify safeguarding the public against "fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and similar
abuses", plaintiff must resort to the contention that the regulation is
unreasonable, as being arbitrary, discriminatory or confiscatory. It is
difficult to see how this can be sustained in view of the fact that since
1938 ticket brokers have been operating under the agreement mentioned
above, which fixes the price at seventy-five cents above that charged by
the producer, and which also provides that unsold tickets may be returned, thus reducing the risk of loss. It is to be noted, although the
Tyson case did not turn on the issue of reasonableness of the price
608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549, 81 L. ed. 835 (1937). In Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten
Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 56 Sup. Ct. 457, 80 L. ed. 675 (1936), an act which limited
the benefit of a price differential to milk dealers not having a well-advertised trade
name to those who were already engaged in the business at a certain date was
held unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law by an unreasonable

and arbitrary classification.
In Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S.441, 57 Sup. Ct. 842, 81 L. ed. 1210 (1937),
a Georgia statute fixing maximum charges for handling and selling leaf tobacco
was held constitutional. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct.
394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1923) was overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U. S.379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed. 703 (1937) which upheld a minimum wage
law of Washington. In Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 309
U. S.310, 60 Sup. Ct. 517, 84 L. ed. 481 (1940) a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of a statute fixing prices in the citrus fruit industry was denied.
" Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 59 Sup. Ct.
528, 83 L. ed. 752 (1939); United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S.
533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 83 L. ed. 1446 (1939). The latter case paralleled the Nebbia
decision, as to federal power to regulate prices under the interstate conunerce
clause. See Polikoff, Commodity Price Fixing and the Supreme Court (1940) 88
PENN. L. Riy. 934.

" 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) at 500, and cases cited.
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fixed, that the limitation under the former statute was fifty cents rather
than seventy-five, and that the practice at that time was outright purchase of blocks of seats.
Should this case reach the United States Supreme Court, there seems
small reason to believe that the court will depart from the principle of
the Nebbia decision and the line of cases following it. Again, in the
words of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "In my opinion, the true principle is
that the State's power extends to every regulation of any business rea36
sonably required and- appropriate for the public protection."
CAROLINE W.

CARR.

Courts-Contempt-Undue Influence to Drop Civil Action.
An administrator instituted suit for wrongful death against the B-C
Remedy Company in the Federal District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina. N., not a party to the litigation but related to one
of the owners of the defendant, sent M. to the South Carolina home of
the administrator to bring him to the Lumberton home of N., where he
was entertained overnight and plied with liquor. M. had summarily
removed the administrator, an elderly and uneducated man, from his
home after having induced him to become intoxicated. The next morning, the administrator, not then under the influence of liquor but under
the domination of M. and N., signed papers, without any consultation
with his attorney, dismissing the wrongful death action. Upon the
attorney's disclosure of these facts, N. and M. were adjudged guilty of
contempt by the Federal Court.'
Congress has conferred on the Federal courts the power to punish
as contempt "the misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court
2
or so near thereunto as to obstruct the administration of justice".
Within this restriction, the courts determine what is a contempt.3 Dicta
have prescribed that the test of a contempt is the character of the act
done and its effect upon the discharge of judicial functions. 4 The courts
have determined that their first duty is to protect their litigants and to
permit nothing to be done which will tend to the miscarriage of justice.5
On the other hand, the courts are eager to encourage compromise and
amicable settlement of suits outside of court. They are also anxious to
avoid interference with freedom of speech and fair comment. These
considerations call for statesmanlike discrimination.
" See note 24, supra.
'Nye v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
Certiorari
granted in late December. 1940.
136 STAT. 1163 (1911), 26 U. S.C.A. §385 (1928).
"United States v. McLeod, 119 Fed. 416 (C. C. Ala. 1902).
'Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S.402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62
L. ed. 1186 (1918).
'Wilson v. Irwin, 144 Ky. 311, 138 S.W. 373, 42 L. R. A. (.s.) 722 (1911).
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The contention that the court lacked power to punish acts done beyond the boundaries of the Middle District is untenable. Neither spatial
nor lineal distance is determinative of such jurisdiction. The act is
considered done in the presence of the court where it becomes effective,
not in the jurisdiction where it was begun. 6 Conduct wrongfully tending to obstruct the exercise of judicial power is punishable irrespective
of the place of commission.7 "The question is not one of geography or
topography or propinquity or remoteness, but one of direct influence
upon the administration of justice. The administration of justice is
equally obstructed wherever the act is done; and the place of solicitation
is of absolutely no consequence whatever. Whether the act was done
in the courthouse, or a mile, or a hundred miles away, the result is
precisely the same; the disturbance to the court is the same."
Did the acts of the defendants constitute contempt? The usual case
of this class of indirect contempts contains an element of force,0 intimidation,10 threat," or bribery 12 directed toward an officer of the court,
juror, witness, or party. This case is unique in that these factors were
conspicuously absent. This is a case of domination and control of a
plaintiff, weakened with liquor, by stronger personalities operating on
behalf of the defendant. Perhaps the nearest analogy lies in the cases
where it has been held contempt to try to influence a judge or witness
by conversations or editorials which create a prejudicial viewpoint toward pending litigation. 13
'Snow v.Hawkes, 183 N. C. 365, 111 S.E. 621, 23 A. L. R. 183 (1922).
'United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. 700 (S. D. Ga. 1913); In re Independent
Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849, L. R. A. 1917E, 703 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917) ; Froelich
v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 660 (C: C. A. 8th, 1929); Conley v. United States,
59 F. (2d) 929 (C.C. A. 8th, 1932).
1 McCauley v. United States, 25 App. D. C. 404 (1905) (attempt to corrupt
juror).
'In re Brule, 71 Fed. 943 (D. Nev. 1895) (third party induced material witness not to appear in court) ; Turk v. State, 123 Ark. 341, 185 S.W. 472 (1916)
(P. on way to court induced by threats of D. and others to leave jurisdiction) ;
Ex parte McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 51 S. E. 957, 2 L. R. A. (N.s.) 603 (1905)
(third party, disliking sentence rendered in certain case, assaulted judge) ; In re
Fountain, 182 N. C. 49, 108 S.E. 342, 18 A. L. R. 208 (1921)' (case having been
decided against him, Fountain assaulted discharged juror).
" Wilson v. Irwin, 144 Ky. 311, 138 S.W. 373, 42 L. R. A. (N.s.) 722 (1911);
Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N. C. 365, 111 S.E. 621, 23 A. L. R. 183 (1922) ; (P., in
foreign state, forced by D.'s threats to withdraw suit) ; King v. Barnes, 113 N. Y.
476, 21 N. E. 182 (1889) (stockholder having control over officers in corporation
induced them to evade carrying out court order).
" McCarthy v. State, 89 Tenn. 543, 15 S. W. 736 (1891) (P. kept out of
court by D.'s threats).
" Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924) (D. gave juror
$1000 and whiskey to hang jury); Richardson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 229, 158
S. E. 369 (1931) (attempt to bribe witness); Creekman v. United States, 237
Fed. 743, L. R. A. 1917C, 845 (C.C. A. 8th, 1916), cert. denied, 242 U. S. 646,
37 Sup. Ct. 240, 61 L. ed. 544 (1917).
" it re Parker, 299 Fed. 1006 (S. D. Cal. 1924), aff'd Parker v. United
States, 3 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; cert. denied, 268 U. S. 694, 45 Sup.
Ct. 513, 69 L. ed. 1161 (1925) ; Gridley v. United States, 44 (F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A.
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The principal case reaches a desirable result and is based upon a
sound policy, namely, that inducements to drop the prosecution of a
pending case which go beyond the mere exercise of free speech or of a
fair effort to compromise equitably outside of court, may be dealt with
as contempt of court. Thus, the courts will punish such wrongful acts
even where the offended litigant has condoned them. For, the powers
of the court may be exerted because of the defendant's deliberate purpose
4
to interfere with the orderly procedure of the tribunal.1
The North Carolina statute gives to the courts power to punish for
contempt, acts which tend to defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice the
rights or remedies of a party to the action then pending.15 Under this
broad authority, it appears safe to predict that the North Carolina courts
will, not hesitate to go at least as far as did the instant Federal court.
PHYLLIS JANE CAMPBELL.

Criminal Law-Property Subject to Larceny in North Carolina.
Recently North Carolina's Supreme Court decreed that a tombstone
erected at a grave becomes a chattel real and hence not the subject of
common law larceny, if stolen by "one continuous act".' This suggests
a profitable inquiry into the nature and types of property protected
against larceny, at common law and by statute.
All authority agrees that the subject matter of common law larceny
must be the personality of another, 2 yet this only gives rise to vexing
problems, namely: (a) what is personalty,3 as distinguished from
realty, (b) what effect has a severance upon the character of real
property, (c) what rules govern choses in action, animals, and property
sui generis.
At common law the non-protection of land included ores and minerals beneath and growth above.4 Articles affixed to the land with
intent of permanency lost their character as personalty, 5 but not those
6th, 1930), cert. dentied, 283 U. S. 827, 51 Sup. Ct. 351, 75 L. ed. 1441 (1931);
Ex parte Jarvis, 57 Cal. App. 533, 207 Pac. 494 (1922).
In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217 (C. C. Ala. 1910).
N. C. CoDS ANN. (Michie, 1939) §985.
N
State v. Jackson, 218 N. C. 373, 11 S. E. (2d) 149 (1940).
-1 Hale, P .C. *510; 4 BL. CoMM. *232; 2 BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed.

1892) §761.
'What is personalty varies for purposes of criminal and civil law. Loose

plank is a fixture. Bryan v. Lawrence, 50 N. C. 337 (1858) ; a still fixed in
masonry on land not a fixture. Feimster v. Johnson, 64 N. C. 259 (1870) ; trade
fixtures, poultry houses and fences, a fixture. Causey v. Orton, 171 N. C. 375,
88 S. E. 513 (1916).
'State v. Foy, 82 N. C. 679 (1880) (cabbage); 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW
(8th ed. 1892) §577; Note (1914) 49 L. R. A. (x. s) 965.
'Rails, when made into a fence upon the land, become a part of the realty.
State v. Graves, 74 N. C. 396 (1876). But the nature and strength of the union
is immaterial. State v. Martin, 141 N. C. 832, 53 S. E. 874 (1906).
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articles temporarily annexed8 or those used merely in connection with
the realty.7 Documents evidencing an interest in realty 8 and gold nuggets lying unattached on the surface9 were said to savor of realty and
thereby to lose protection continually. But those articles adhering to
the soil acquired or regained their character as personality and became
the subject of common law larceny when severed by the owner or a
third person, or even by the thief, provided the severance and the asportation were distinct and not parts of a continuous transaction. To
constitute severance the article had to be removed from its original seat
and left in a detached state, whereby it might legalistically come into
the owners possession as personalty. A mere lapse of time between
the severance and carrying away did not make the act larceny, if the
trespasser failed to relinquish possession.' 0 The "one continuous act"
rule is one of the most cumbersome technicalities of the common law
and a constant stumbling block to justice. It has been abrogated in
many states by statute as to certain types of property, and completely in
several jurisdictions by judicial decision. 1'
North Carolina statutes have redrawn the common law dividing
line. In 1811, the first act abolishing the old realty rule unfortunately
listed only "growing, standing, or ungathered corn or maize, cotton or
rice".12 Before 1836, "wheat and potatoes" were added,13 and prior to
1854, "tobacco, pulse and other grains". 14 In 1868, "peanuts" were
specified and also "fruits or vegetables or other product cultivated for
food. or market", 5 a phrase which has caused most of the subsequent
litigation. Thus amended, the statute remains today.18 An indictment
under it for theft of "seed cotton and lent cotton" without the superadded words "growing, standing or ungathered" was held to charge no
offense, since it might refer to the cotton after being picked.17 Following the literal meaning of the phrase the court has held that "figs" and
"A window, fastened only by cross lathes and not hung or beaded into the
frame, held not a part of realty. Reg. v. Hedges, 1 Leach, C. C. 201 (Crown
Case) 1779.
A chapel bell if not fixed. Rex. v. Nixon, 7 Car. & P. 442 (Nisi Prius 1836).
Key, though in a house door lock, is subject of larcency. Hoskins v. Tarrance,
5 Blackf. (Ind.) 417, 35 Am. Rec. 129 (1840).
82 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §770; a commission to settle
boundaries of a manor within this rule. Reg. v. Westbeer, I Leach 12 (Crown

Case 1779).

"Severance

by nature immaterial and remains realty. State v. Burt, 64 N. C.

619 (1870).
' Turpentine remaining in boxes on trees is subject of larceny. State v. Moore,
33 N. C. 70 (1850). Severance of ore, as of a nugget of gold, by natural causes,
is not such a severance as to make it personalty. State v. Burt, 64 N. C. 619;
State v. Graves, 74 N. C. 396 (1876) (rail fences).
" Note (1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. s.) 969.
'IN. C. PuB. LAWS 1811. c. 816.
'IN. C. REv. STAT. 1836-7, c. 34, §25.
'N. C. PB. LAWS 1868-9, c. 251.
14 Revised Code 1854, c. 34, §21.
'"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4257.
" State v. Bragg, 86 N. C. 688 (1882).
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"watermelons," not specifically named in the statute, must be averred
to have been cultivated for food or market 3 8 In 1866, a supplementary
act"" gave protectiofi to "any wood or other kind of property whatsoever, growing or or being" on the land. It now stands as originally
passed2 0 and apparently covers the vast and valuable uncultivated vegetation of the soil, "crops" in the broad sense, not covered by the crop
statute. As the preamble of the act states that its purpose is to prevent
trespassing off lands and the stealing of "any kind of property therefrom" the legislature evidently intended to create a "catch-all" statute,
but the wording of the act has apparently worked its own defeat. 2' A
conservative court narrowed by construction the phrase "or other kind
of property whatsoever" to include only property of like character to
that mentioned. 22 But 'several years later it was decided that the addition of "whatsoever" showed a clear intention to cover "fixtures" ;23
consequently, "30 lbs. of brass railing" attached to the freehold is a
statutory subject of larceny. This decision by way of dictum says that
the sole purpose of the act is to abolish the technical distinction inherent
in "one continuous act". If this be held the legislative purpose, a loose
gold nugget already severed from the soil by natural causes would not
fall within the statute; furthermore, it might be deemed akin to treasure
trove and hence not protected against theft.24 Seemingly, "ginseng",
which usually is found wild, would be within the statute2 5 but in 1905 a
statute-was passed making it a felony to steal ginseng provided it "be
in beds and the land upon which such beds are located shall be surrounded by a lawful fence"-perhaps to give specific warning against
taking what is generally considered an offensive weed.
While a mere piece of paper was the subject of common law larceny, paper evidencing a chose in action, including muniments of title,
lost its value and existence as property 26 for "though the evidence is
"8"It was 'never intended by this statute to make blackberries growing in fence

corners or persimmons on a tree standing in an abandoned old field the subject of
larcency. Figs sometimes grow uncultivated in waste places." State v. Liles, 78
N. C. 496 (1878); uncultivated watermelons not included. State v. Thompson,
93 N. C. 537 (1885). But it is not necessary to aver cultivation of corn for it is
specifically
listed. State v. Ballard, 97 N. C. 444, I S. E. 685 (1887).
1
N. C. Pun. LAws, 1866, c. 60. Pointing out that growing trees, plants, shrubs,
flowers, minerals and metals, fences and other erections upon the land were not
covered by the Act of 1811. State v. Vosburg, 111 N. C. 719, 16 S. E. 392 (1892).
20N. C. CODE AiN.

(Michie, 1939) §4259.

Reason for statute was to deter the great numbers of shiftless people who
were maliciously trespassing after the Civil War. State v. Crawley, 103 N. C.
353, 9 S. E. 409 (1889). Apparently theft by an invitee or mere licensee is not
larcency under this statute. State v. Boyce, 109 N. C. 734, 14 S.E. 391 (1891).
"' Theft of paper money no offense. State v. Vosburg, 111 N. C. 719, 16 S.E.
392 (1892).
' State v. Beck, 141 N. C. 829, 53 S. E. 843 (1906).
,State v. Burt, 64 N. C. 619 (1870).
"N. C. Ptm. LAws 1905, c. 211; N. C. CoDE AN. (Michie, 1939) §4258.
"State v. Brown, 53 N. C. 443 (1862) (bank note); State v. Dill, 75 N. C.
2
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stolen the right remains the same". 27 But if the chose ir;action was
void as being defective, or had been paid, an indictment would lie for
stealing the paper on which it was written.28 North Carolina largely
repudiated this doctrine in 1811,29 specifically covering by statute "any
bank note, check or other order for the payment of money issued by or
drawn on any bank or other society or corporation within this state or
within any of the United States, or any treasury warrant, debenture,
certificate of stock, or other public security or certificate of stock in
any corporation, or other order, bill of exchange, bond, or promissory
note or other obligation either for the payment of money or for the
delivery of specific articles (notwithstanding any of the said particulars
may be termed in law a chose in action)". This statute has received
liberal construction and the phrase "or other obligation" has been held
to embrace similar obligations to those specifically enumerated regardless of their informality. 0 However, a paid "due-bill"8 1 is not within
the statute and apparently a deed, receipt or other instrument not embodying an existing obligation likewise are not covered. Although comprehensive on its face, this statute did not repeal the common law doctrine in toto. Foreign and territorial notes, etc., are not issued "within"
any of the United States,3

2

but perhaps these and like items are included

under "other obligations."' 38 Court records have been protected since
1429,34 and North Carolina by amendment to the original act included
the records of the Register of Deeds and County Commissioners.3 5
Testamentary instruments, of dead as well as living persons, are specifically protected.3 6
North Carolina follows the common law rules closely concerning
animals which were personalty and the subject of larceny. No right of
257 (1876) (currency); State v. Campbell, 103 N. C. 344, 9 S. E. 410 (1889);
4 BL.Comm. *234; 2 BISHOP, CminTAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §769.
' Reg. v. Watts, Dears. C. C. 326 (Crown Case 1854).
"State v. Campbell, 103 N. C. 344, 9 S. E. 410 (1889) ; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912) §1115; CLARK & MARsHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (2nd ed.

1927) §311.
"N. C. Puv. LAws 1811, c. 814, §1; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4254.
'0"The
phrase is used in a remedial and comprehensive sense"'. State v. Camp3

bell,10 N. C. 344, 9 S. E. 410 (1889).
State v. Campbell, 103 N. C. 344, 9 S.E. 410 (1889).
An indictment charging the theft of a bank note without averring by what
authority it was issued was held fatally defective. State v. Brown, 53 N. C. 443
(1862). But as the statute is silent as to necessary authority, National Bank
Notes, issued under authority of an act of Congress, are included for they were
issued geographically "within" one of the United States, to-wit, New York. State
v. Banks, 61 N. C. 577 (1869).
" Treasury Notes, issued as a class since enactment of statute, included State
v. Thompson, 71 N. C. 146 (1874). Also a United States pension check, unendorsed. State v. Bishop, 98 N. C. 773, 4 S. E. 357 (1887).
" 8 Henry VI, c. 12, §3 (1429).
'IN. C. PuB. LAWS 1881, c. 17; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4255.
"1N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4256.
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property was recognized in animals ferae wwurae, including wild fish
and birds, while in their natural state, yet they became personalty by
being killed, confined, tamed or otherwise reclaimed if fit for food 7 or
the production of food,3s or perhaps for any useful purpose.3 9 The
"one continuous act" applied to animals ferac naturae as to realty. 40
The marking of a whale reclaims it, and possibly the mere chasing of a
wounded fox is sufficient, but the taming of wild animals does not give
possession of their young unless they are also under the owner's physical restraint.41 As a general rule, eggs partake of the status of the
animal laying them. 42 The flesh 43 and hides44 of dead animals, whether
ferae naturaze or tame, was the subject of larceny, but living dogs, even
though tamed, were deemed base in nature and consequently unprotected.4 5 Late cases adhere to this rule, although for civil purposes
dogs are treated as personalty.46 A North Carolina tax statute has made
licensed dogs the subject of larceny,47 but where the tax is not required
for pups under six months of age or hunting dogs in packs of over six,
the law governing them is in doubt. The North Carolina Court in a
dictum has regarded oysters similar to realty, 48 but shellfish in beds are
the subject of larceny by statute.49 To take "any fish from any net of
any kind" is a misdemeanor.50
Even though the property be personalty, it was mandatory that it
be determinate, legally the subject of ownership. Therefore, the theft
of treasure trove, a wreck not seized, seaweed, and things abandoned
" State v. Krider, 78 N. C, 481 (1878) (fish). But "the turkey is a domestic
animal, and not a creature ferae naturae." State v. Turner, 66 N. C. 618 (1892) ;
1 Hale, P. C. 510; 4 BL. Comm. *235; 2 BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892)
§771; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912) §1104.
"State v. Murphy, 8 Blackf. (Ind. 1847) 498 (reclaimed bees).
Repudiates the English Doctrine that animals unfit for food if generous in
nature are protected, but not if base, by declaring "the true criterion is the value
of the animal, whether for the food of man, its fur, or otherwise". State v.
House, 65 N. C. 315, 6 Am. Rep. 744 (1871).
CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (2nd ed. 1927) §308.
1 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §§776, 778.
"122 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912) §1105.
" But an indictment for theft of "one pound of meat of the value of 5c" held
fatally defective for uncertainty. State v. Patrick, 79 N. C. 655 (1878); 2
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912) §1109.
"12 BIsHoi-, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §772.
"'State v. Holder, 81 N. C. 527, 31 Am. Rep. 517 (1879). Also cats, bears,
foxes, apes, polecats, monkeys, ferrets, squirrels, -parrots, singing birds, martens,
and coons. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912) §1107.
"State v. Lathan, 35 N. C. 33 (1851) (action for malicious mischief).
"N. C. PuR. LAWs 1917, c. 206, §9; 1919, c. 116, §10; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §§1683, 1693, 4263.
"' Makely v. Boothe Co., 129 N. C. 11, 39 S. E. 582 (1901).
Considered as
animals fit for food when planted in beds capable of identification. State v. Taylor, 27 N. J. Law (Sup. Ct., 1858) 117; or as domestic animals when planted.
Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42 (N. Y. 1837).
"IN. C. PuB. LAWs 1887, c. 119, §15; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1945.
"N. C. PuB. LAWS 1883, c. 137, §5; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1971.
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by the owner"' was not larceny. This was also true of a dead human
being, in which the criminal law recognized no property, but otherwise
as to a coffin, grave clothes, or other articles upon or interred with a
58
-dead body. 52 However, there could be larceny of buried animals.
Goods unlawfully acquired or possessed and lost property were also the
subject of larceny. 54 The slightest value was sufficient even if it be
value to the possessor alone.5 5 The stealing of a slave was early held
to be larceny under the view that a slave is a personal chattel, and that
protection should extend "to every species of personal property, though
not admitted and known as a subject of larcency when the law was
formed." 50 Had this maxim been followed the perennial search for
rules and much litigation could have been avoided.
Statutory changes, whose treatment is beyond the scope of this note,
have expanded the crime, for example: the altering of timber trade
marks ;57 taking of horses, mules, automobiles, electric vehicles, and
aircraft for temporary purposes only ;58 and the mere pursuing or killing of live stock with felonious intent. 59 Recently protection has been
given the complete stock in museum and libraries, 60 and even discarded
soft drink bottles and containers. 61
Piecemeal statutory enactments mingled with remnants of ancient
common law have left confusion in their wake. North Carolina may
well discard unreasoning technicalities in favor of a modern and intelligent restatement.
HENRY L. HARKEY.
State v. Hathway, 150 N. C. 798, 63 S. E. 892, (1909) (abandoned fish slide).
" The property interred with deceased is not regarded as abandoned property,
the title is in the estate or person who buried him. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAI! LAW
(l1th ed. 1912) §1098; CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (2nd ed. 1927) §307.
51

" Reg. v. Edwards, 13

Cox. C.

C. (Cr. App. 1777) 384 (pigs).

""It is larceny to steal stolen goods from a thief: and generally whatever is
produced by wrong is the subject of this offense the same as are the -products of
right." 2 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §781; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAW (11th ed. 1912) §1118. But one finding and concealing a lost carpet bag,
having been directed to recover it, is not guilty of larceny, but breach of trust.
States v. England, 53 N. C. 399 (1861).
" Indictment for theft of "one-half ten-shilling bill of the currency of the
state" quashed for such bill is destitute of both artificial and intrinsic value. State
v. Bryant, 4 N. C. 249 (1815); 2 WHAATON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912)
§1119; CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW Or CRIMES (2nd ed. 1927) §312. But anything
animate or inanimate while on exhibition at fairs is the subject. N. C. Pub. Laws
1870-1, c. 184, §4; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4335.
"State v. Hall, 1 N. C. 168 (1779). For statute see, N. C. PUB. LAWS 1779,
c. 142, §2; N. C. RF.. STAT. 1836-7, c. 34, §9; Revised Code 1854, c. 34, §10.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§3991, 3992.
'N.
C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4261 (horses and mules), §4262 (automobiles and electric vehicles), §191(y) (aircraft).
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§4264, 4265.
°N. C. PUB. LAWS 1935, c. 300; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4511.
"N. C. Pun. LAWs 1937, c. 322, §§1, 2; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§4265(a).
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Judgments--Constitutional Exemptions-Set-Off Against
Claims Which Are Exempt Property.
P holds a judgment against D for $385.00 and D holds judgment
against P for $316.47. P alleges D to be insolvent and prays for a
set-off. D asks that his judgment against P be allotted as his personal
property exemption claimable under the Constitution.' The court, believing D entitled to have his judgment exempt from sale under
execution, dismissed P's motion of set-off, which dismissal was affirmed
on appeal. 2 Thus the North Carolina court has forced one man to pay
his entire xdebt to a person who in turn owes him an amount which will
never be collectible in full, due to the latter's insolvency. This refuses
to recognize that in fairness the only debt really due is the difference
in the amounts owed.
The decision of the principal case follows the almost universal rule
of construction that exemption statutes are designed to protect the
debtor from absolute poverty and the likelihood of becoming a charge
upon the state, and accoidingly are to be liberally construed 3 Infrequently such statutes have been strictly construed on the theory that
they are in derogation of the common law.
Some statutes exempt from execution certain specific articles of
personal property.5 Where there is a wrongful levy of execution upon
such property pursuant to a judgment, and subsequently the injured
party obtains a judgment for the wrongful conversion, a motion for
set-off of the former judgment 6 against the latter judgment will be
denied,7 For to allow such a set-off would be to defeat the statute,
IN. C. CoNsT. art. X, §1.
("The personal property of any resident of this
state, to the value of five hundred dollars, to be selected by such resident, shall be
and is hereby exempted from sale under execution or other final process of any
court issued for the collection of any debt:')
Egerton v. Johnson, 218 N. C. 300 (1940).
'Picknell v. Jerauld. 1 Ind. App. 10, 27 N. E. 433 (1891) ; Kendrick v. Hudson,
86 Mo. App. 501 (1900); State v. Bank of Crab Orchard, 122 Neb. 210, 239 N.
W. 836 (1932); Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. D. 455, 75 N. W. 908 (1898);
Bradley v. Earle, 22 N. D. 139, 132 N. W. 660 (1911) ; Rookard v. Atlanta & C.
Air Line Ry., 89 S. C. 371, 71 S.E. 992 (1911).
'Beaupre v. Scott, 3 Minn. 419; Mallory v. Norton, 21 Barb. 424 (N. Y.
1856) ; Knobb v. Drake, 23 Pa. St. 489 (1854).
"I.e. Tools necessary for a laborer's work; specified number of horses, household articles, etc.
'I.e. Judgment pursuant to which wrongful execution levied is still in existence
since wrongful execution does not satisfy or extinguish it.
7
Ex parte Hunt, 62 Ala. 1 (1878) ; Ray v. Gregory, 120 Ark. 50, 178 S. W.
405 (1915) ; Treat v. Wilson, 65 Kan. 729, 70 Pac. 893 (1902) ; Elder v. Frement,
18 Nev. 446, 5 Pac. 69 (1884) ; Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. D. 453, 75 N. W.
908 (1898); Duff v. Wells, 7 Heisk. 17 (Tenn. 1871); Cone v. Lewis, 64 Tex.
331 (1885); Howard v. Tardy, 79 Tex. 450, 15 S. W. 578 (1891); Snow v. West.
37 Utah 528, 110 Pac. 52 (1910) ; Below v. Robbins, 76 Wis. 600, 45 N. W. 416
(1890) ; cf. Johnson v. Hall, 84 Mo. 210 (1884) (if a replevy is obtained and also
a judgment of damages for the wrongful levy, the latter is subject to set-off) ;
State v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 135 Mo. App. 160, 115 S. W.
1081 (1909) (allowing a set-off of a judgment obtained for the breach of an attach-
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since the judgment creditor even though prohibited from directly executing against this exempt property, has already converted the property
and a set-off would in result be equivalent to sustaining a direct levy on
the exempt property.8 Other courts 9 allow a set-off of such judgments
on the theory that the plaintiff in the wrongful conversion suit might
have elected to obtain the specific property by repleven or its value by
trover and if he elects to sue for damages rather than to recover the
specific article, the law will not later exempt the judgment for him since
the exemption law is designed to protect only the specific article. 10 This
view is rejected in most states, because inconsistent with a liberal interpretation of exemption statutes, since it defeats the purpose of the
statute and sanctions the wrong,' especially where there was no true
election of remedies because of the inability of the impoverished debtor

to post a replevin bond.12
Where specific claims are exempt, as claims for wages' or compensation under the Workmens' Compensation Act,1 4 there will be no
set-off of a judgment against such exempt claim, especially if the judgment is assigned. 15
Then there is the type of provision involved in the principal case
which exempts from execution personal property to be selected by the
debtor, up to a specified value. Under facts similar to those of the
principal case, the rule adopted by the great majority of courts is that
of the principal case-a denial of the set-off. 16 The leading case is
ment bond against the judgment under which attachment was made, due to the
court's construction of Missouri's "set-off of mutual debts" statute as paramount
to the
right of exemption).
8
Atkinson v. Pittman, 47 Ark. 464, 2 S. W. 144 (1886) (set-off does indirectly
what the prohibited final process does directly) ; Coppage v. Gregg, 1 Ind. App.
112, 27 N. E. 570 (1891) (same); Beattyville Co. v. Sizemore, 203 Ky. 7, 261
S. W. 620 (1924) (sale under execution) ; First Nat. Bank of Cushing v. Funnell,
144 Okla. 188, 290 Pac. 177 (1930) (final process) ; Collier v. Murphy, 90 Tenn.
300, 16 S. W. 465 (1891) (seizure) ; Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Ring, 187 S.E. 449
(Va. 1936) (attachment).
I See note 4, s.pra.
10 Tally v. Palmer, 112 Kan. 391, 210 Pac. 1104 (1923)
(while not allowing
the judgment for wrongful conversion to be forever exempt, will allow it to be
exempt for a time sufficient to realize on it and to buy more exempt property
with1 the proceeds).
' Howard v. Tardy, 79 Tex. 450, 15 S. W. 578 (1891); dissent to Cardwell
v. Ryan,
210 Mo. 17, 108 S. W. 533 (1908).
12
Tally v. Palmer, 112 Kan. 391, 210 Pac. 1104 (1923).
13 Banks v. Rodenback, 54 Iowa 695, 7 N. W. 152 (1880) ; Millington v. Launer,
89 Iowa 322, 56 N. W. 533 (1893) ; Bauer v. Teasdale, 25 Mo. App. 25 (1887) ;
William Deering Co. v. Ruffner, 32 Neb. 845, 49 S. W. 771 (1891); Collier v.
Murphy, 90 Tenn. 300, 16 S. W. 465 (1891); Dempsey v. McKennell, 2 Tex.
Civ. App. 284, 23 5. W. 525 (1893).
"Beattyville Co. v. Sizemore, 203 Ky. 7, 261 S.W. 620 (1914).
13 Bauer v. Teasdale, 25 Mo. App. 25 (1887).
"Atkinson v. Pittman, 47 Ark. 464, 2 S.W. 114 (1886) ; Butner v. Bowser,
104 Ind. 255, 3 N. E. 889 (1885) ; Junker v. Hustes, 113 Ind. 524, 16 N. E. 197
(1887); Picknell v. Jerauld, 1 Ind. App. 10, 27 N. E. 433 (1891); Grant v.
Phoenix-Jellico Coal Co., 155 Ky. 585, 159 S.W. 1161 (1913); Wylie v. Grundysen, 51 Minn. 360, 53 N. W. 805 (1892); Smith v. McMillian, 84 N. C. 593
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Curlee v. Thomas.1 7 There separate judgments had been obtained in
separate actions on co-existent claims (thus potential though unutilized
counterclaims), and upon execution pursuant to one judgment there
was a motion for set-off, but the owner of the judgment under which
execution was to be made claimed' it as exempt; consequently, the
motion was denied.
Ohio, 19 by interpreting their statute,2 0 providing "when cross demands have existed between persons under such circumstances, that if
a person had brought an action against the other a counterclaim or setoff could have been set up... the two demands must be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other," as applying also to cross
judgments which are proper subjects of set-off, has reached a different
result and allows a set-off in spite of a claim of exemption. In other
words they have adopted by statute the rule of the civil law system on
this point. Nebraska,21 confronted with a similar statute and the precedent of the Ohio court, recognized this as the civil law rule but refused
to adopt it.
A kindred subject is involved where P, in the enforcement of a
claim, gets a judgment against D, and in a prior suit on the same claim
D had recovered a judgment for costs against P. In such a case when
the exemption is asserted by P a motion for set-off has been both allowed 22 and disallowed. 23 Missouri, having reversed its original stand,
all equities to let D lose from
now allows set-off, saying that it is against
24
P's error in bringing the first action.
Where an action is brought and the defendant counterclaims, the
majority of courts hold that even though under the applicable statute
it be a proper counterclaim it will be denied if the plaintiff asks that his
claim be exempt under the personal property exemption statute. 25 Only
in North Carolina, 26 Ohio, 27 and Missouri28 has such a counterclaim
(1881). But cf. Hogan v. Kirkland, 64 N. C. 251 (1870) (exemption not claimed).
See Coppage v. Gregg, 1 Ind. App. 112, 27 N. E. 570, 571 (1891) ; Butler v. Stain1774 N. C. 51 (1876).
back, 87 N. C. 216 (1882).
id See Hogan v. Kirkland, 64 N. C. 251 (1870).
Serhart v. Pearce, 73 Ohio St. 250, 76 N. E. 943 (1906).
20 OHio REV. STAT. 1880, §5073.

State v. Bank of Crab Orchard, 122 Neb. 210, 239 N. W. 836 (1932).
Wabash R. P. v. Bowing, 103 Mo. App.'158, 77 S. W. 106 (1903).
" Bowen v. Holden, 95 Mo. App. 1, 75 S. W. 686 (1901) ; Rookard v. Atlanta
"4See note 22, supra.
& C. Air Line Ry., 89 S. C. 371, 71 S. E. 992 (1911).
" Smith v. Sills, 126 Ind. 205, 25 N. E. 881 (1890) ; Coffing v. Durgon, 6 Ind.
App. 386, 33 N. E. 815 (1893); First National Bank of Cushing v. Funnell, 144
Okla. 188, 290 Pac. 177 (1930); Bradley v. Earle, 22 N. D. 139, 132 N. W. 660
(1911) ; Collier v. Murphy, 90 Tenn. 300, 16 S. W. 465 (1891); Atlantic Life
Ins. Co. v. Ring, 187 S. E. 44 (Va. 1936).
2" Lynn v. Cotton Mills, 130 N. C. 621, 41 S. E. 877 (1902).
(1894) ; see Serhart v. Haker, 73 Ohio
27 Pierce v. Kepner, 52 Ohio St. 615
St. 250, 255, 76 N. E. 943, 944 (1906).
(Statute provides
3 See Cardwell v. Ryan, 210 Mo. 17, 108 S. W. 533 (1908)
21

2

for "set-off of mutual debts.").
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been allowed where the exemption was pleaded. However, Arkansas 2
holds with this minority in all cases where the counterclaim arises out
of the same transaction, arguing that neither party has ever had the
right to claim his right of action against the other party as exempt from
the other's claim against him, for the simple reason that the two causes
of action having grown out of the same transaction, one extinguishes the
other pro tanto. In other words it reduces each party's right to recover
the amount of his debt from the other and never forms a part of his
constitutional exemption. Another sound technical argument is that of
the North Carolina court, which states that "exemption is not available
before judgment so as to destroy the right of counterclaim or set-off,"8 0
because there has been no execution or final process in setting off two
claims neither of which are reduced to judgment, and the Constitution
provides only for exemption against "sale under execution or final
process issued upon judgment recovered on any debt."81 "Otherwise
one could recover judgment when on a balance struck nothing is due
him. 18 2 Thus the North Carolina court recognizes the injustice of

allowing A's exempt claim to prevail against B regardless of a claim of
B against A not recoverable because A is insolvent. But when the
claims are reduced to judgment the court has felt bound by the constitutional provision as to "sale under execution or final process issued
upon a judgment recovered on any debt."88
By far the most advisable means of aiding the courts around this

obstacle is to adopt either by statute or judicial decision the civil law
rule, discussed by Justice Story, 4 "that cross demands may compensate
eacl- other by deducting the lesser from the greater, and that the difference is the only sum which can be justly due." 85 He regrets and won-

ders why the rule was adopted "for the sake of the form of proceeding
and convenience of trial .. . that each must sue and recover separately
in separate actions."8 6 Thus, if we should adopt the civil law on this
point, the debts would mutually extinguish each other as a matter of
law, so that as soon as mutual debts came into existence the only "property" would be the difference between them, and that part of the debts extinguished would be no longer "property" which could be claimed as
87

exempt.
Another solution, which is akin to the civil law, is to allow mutual
demands or judgments to be liens upon each other.
0 Harry v. Williams, 122 Ark. 148, 182 S. W. 546 (1916).
30 Lynn v. Cotton Mills, 130 N. C. 621, 622, 41
v. Johnson, 218 N. C. 300, 302 (1940).
2' See
"Lynn v. Cotton Mills, 130 N. C. 621, 622, 41
v. Johnson, 218 N. C. 300, 302 (1940).
"8See

" STORY,

35

The rationale is

S. E. 877 (1902); see Egerton
note 1, supra.
S. E. 877 (1902); see Egerton
note 1, supra.

COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1839).

Id. at 656.

" Ibid.

"' Ohio, by statute, has obtained such a result. See note 22, supra.

1941]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

that up to the point that mutuality exists, each has an interest in the
other's claim against him, and each should be allowed to protect the
interest by receiving first payment out of the money due to the other.
Thus would be reached an equitable result without attendant inequities,
and it could be done by judicial decision without the aid of a statute.
The possible solution of amending the constitution, to provide that
where mutual demands exist one may not claim his demand as exempt
against the other's demand, is undesirable because amendment is difficult, and would yield no more than the result afforded by the
civil law. A statute could not be used in lieu of the above amendment
since it would be unconstitutional as restricting the debtor's choice of
exemption. 8
Of course, the legislature might possibly evade the Constitution by
enacting that a judgment is not personal property subject to exemption,
on the theory that the Constitution intended that only tangible property
would be exempt. However, such a statute, while removing the instant
inequity would give birth to an even greater one, for then not only
where mutual claims exist but in all cases there would be no exemption.
Thus all of a person's property might consist of judgments, leaving him
entirely vulnerable to creditors without any exempt property to claim,
and so open to possible impoverishment. Such a result is not to be encouraged. Moreover, there is obviously no reason why, as a general
rule, a judgment should not be exempt as personal property, because
such an exemption just as effectively removes assets from the creditors.
Therefore, it is recommended that our court adopt either the civil
law rule or the mutual lien rule, preferably the former. If they adopt
neither, then a statute should be enacted embodying the civil law rule on
this point.
J. KENYON WILSON, JR.
Labor Law-Constitutional Law-Employer's Freedom
of Speech Under the Wagner Act.
The Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of that part of
the National Relations Board's order directing the Ford Motor Company to cease and desist from . . . "interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by circulating, distributing or otherwise disseminating
among its employees statements or other propaganda which disparage or
criticize labor organizations or which advise its employees not to join
such organizations. . . ."' Section 7 provides that employees shall have
" Comm'rs v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 (1876); see Scott v. Kenan, 94 N. C. 298,
303 (1886).
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the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through their own representatives, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
Suppression of "freedom of speech" has been one of the most widely
discussed issues raised by the National Labor Relations Act. The present 'decision was a culmination of a question of employer's rights which
has been hanging fire, through'a storm of criticism and litigation, for
over three years. However, it may not be a final disposition,' for the
2
Board has indicated that it will petition the Supreme Court for review.
For a complete understanding, it will be necessary to delve into the
backg round of facts giving rise to the instant decision. In the spring of
1937, the United Automobile Workers of America was conducting a
union drive in the plant of the Ford Motor Company. In April, the
management distributed in the plant copies of the Ford Almanac containing a column of anti-union satire and in May reprints of several
anti-union interviews of Mr. Ford, together with a card of "Fordisms",
a compilation of anti-labor organization statements of Mr. Ford.3 Contrary to the usual policy of leaving this material at the gates for the
employees to take or leave as they chose, members of the Ford Service
Department were on hand to thrust the propaganda into the hands of
any who seemed disposed to ignore it. This bitter campaign was
climaxed by a riot 4 in which several organizers and union members were
severely beaten by the Ford police while engaged in a peaceable attempt
to distribute union literature. Upon complaints to the Board regarding,
the riot, dissemination of the Ford publications, discriminatory discharges, and other unfair labor practices as 'defined by the act, the
'N.L.R.B. v. Ford Motor Company, 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
The complete order of the Board is found in In the Matter of Ford Motor Corn.
pany,
14 N.L.R.B. 346, 379.
2 Such an appeal is to be approved, not only because of the constitutional importance of the decision, but also because the reasoning of the circuit court is
ambiguous and not particularly definitive of the issues in the case, which simply
stated, appear to be: (1) was the propaganda coercive per se, or only coercive if
considered with its contextual background? (2) if coercive per se, is it prohibitable under the act? (3) is such prohibition constitutional?
We think
'From the "Ford Gives Viewpoint on Labor" interview: "...
our men ought to consider whether it is necessary for them to pay some outsider
every month for the privilege of working at Ford's. Or whether any union can
do more for them than we are doing.
"If the union leaders are sincere, they should go into business for themselves.
"... I have always made a better bargain for our men than an outsider could.
We never have had to bargain with our men, and we don't expect to begin. now."
(Italics supplied.)
From the "Fordisms": "Figure it out for yourself. If You go into a union
they have Got You,-but what have You Got?"
"What was the result of these strikes-merely that numbers of men put their
necks in an Iron Collar. I'm only trying to Show Who Owns the Collar."
'River Rouge plant, May 26, 1937. A vivid account of the viciousness of the
riot can be found in the Board's order, 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 354 to 376.
'Section 9. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158 (Supp. 1940).
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Board held hearings, made findings of fact, and issued orders. These
orders, though subsequently withdrawn for modification, were reincorporated in the order of August 9, 1939, which the court upheld in
all particulars except the above-quoted cease and desist provision.
The present case is unique in that it constitutes the first use by the
Board of a cease and desist order specifically directed against propaganda, written or oral. Formerly only a general order to cease and
desist from interfering with the right of self-organization and collective
bargaining has been used. Furthermore, it seems to be the first case in
which the narrow question of employer freedom of speech under the
act, independent of any other anti-union coercive activities, has been
raised. To visualize the principles involved here, it is necessary to
project the present case upon a background. of the theories developed
by the Board and the courts in the most nearly analagous situations
arising under the act.
The attitude of the Board: The Board's attitude regarding the employer's freedom of speech under the act has always been relatively
clear.8 A majority of circuit court 'decisions have liberally interpreted
the powers of the Board and have sustained the Board's orders, no one
of which, however, went so far in denying employer rights as the present
one. The Board insists that all expressions of employer opinion hostile
to unions and accompanied by overt acts of discrimination or intimidation are clearly violative of the act, and prohibitable. 7 The courts have
concurred thus far. Where the employer's language has plainly threatened plant removal or shutdown in the event of unionization, the Board
has consistently declared such language an unfair labor practice.8 How' Series of closely analagous situations provoking Board orders are collected
in Rosenfarb, THE NATIONAL LABOR PoLicy (1940) 73 to 76; Myers, "Interference" it Labor Relations Acts (1939) 19 B. U. L. &xv.209, 211; Wettach, Unfair
Labor Practices under the Wagner Act (1938) 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 223,
230; Note (1938) 32 ILL. L. Rav. 568, 589; C. C. H. 1 Labor Law Service §2625
(1940).
...
The Board has found an unfair labor practice under section 8(1)
in employer statements to employees describing union organizers as 'racketeeers,'
'parasites' . . . ; statements asserting that union dues are used by organizers to
buy clothes, get drunk, or to purchase big black cigars; . . . statements disparaging
the effectiveness of the Act in protecting employees and in according them rights
have been held a violation.
"In some cases the statements are not made by the employer himself or through
persons in his employ, but through third persons, such as civic officials, whom the
employer utilizes for such purpose. This also has been held a violation." Third
Annual Report, N.L.R.B. 1938 (pages 59, 60).
'C. C. H. 1 Labor Law Service §2625 (1940) ; Note (1940) 1 BILL oF IGHTS
Ravimw 44, 45. The latter note also discusses the advisability of a Board order
depriving an employer with a record of coercion of even his right to express an
opinion, and concludes that, even if the administrative difficulties were superable,
such a procedure would probably be unconstitutional.
' Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 54, 72, 79: ".... the gravest difficulty for both
the Board and the courts . . . appears to be that of determining whether a given
statement by an employer at a given time is' a mere expression of opinion or
whether it implies a threat as well." In resolving such difficulty, the court has
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ever, at times the Board has gone beyond these circumstances, And
declared that "because of the employer's 'superior economic power' any
expression to employees of hostility to unionism is necessarily 'coercive'
and therefore constitutes unlawful 'interference' by the employer." Support for this view is found in VirginiaRy. v. Union FederationNo. 40,9
where it is said: "Any sort of influence exerted by an employer upon
an employee, dependent upon his employment for means of livelihood,
may very easily become undue in that it will coerce the employee's will
in favor of what the employer desires against his better judgment". 10
To evaluate the court's finding of the non-coercive character of the
statements in the Ford case, it is only necessary to ask: Were the
"Fordisms" an appeal to the employee's mind and judgment, or were
they an appeal to his fear and necessity?"1
Receding somewhat from its most extreme position that any hostile
expression was coercive, the Board in the present case held that the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are qualified and not absolute, and that under certain circumstances an employer's expressions of
opinion on labor policies is not permissible under the statute because
coercive and intimidatory. The Board feels that the Ford situation,
with its background, comes within the forbidden territory, and directs
its desist order not against mere employer opinion but, as stated in a
recent pro-union comment, against speech "upon which was stamped the
whole pattern of ruthless suppression of unionism. The more one comprehends the threads in that pattern,--incredible brutality and systematically inspired fear of economic degradation,-the more accurately . . .
does one take the measure of the Ford utterances as 'expressions of
opinion' ".12

Although granting the view in the Virginia Ry. case quoted above,
the circuit court declared that the Board's ruling holds the employer
forever suspect and, practically applied, necessarily silences him whose
opinion may be the best informed, no matter how honest his views or
how truthful his observations.
The Board might agree that theoretically an employer should be
perforce had to resort to such criteria as the background of the case and its
relationship thereto, the time, place, and the emotional state of the speaker.

84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) aff'd 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592,

81 L. ed. 789 (1937).

" Leading cases in which protection of the First Amendment has been denied

to coercive speech made by supervisory officials to employees are: N.L.R.B. v.
Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (local super-

visors used threats to prevent unionization); Virginia Ferry Corp. v. N.L.I.B.,
101 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) (superintendent warned employees against
joining an outside union); N.L.1LB. v. The Falk Corporation, 102 F. (2d) 383
(C. 1C. A. 7th, 1939) (dictum).
, Greene, Cizil Liberties and the N.L.R.B. (19"40) 8 I. J. A. BULL. 100
(address).
"
1 Note (1938) 7 I J. A. BULL. 38.
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privileged to attempt, by use of argument and reason, to influence his
employees against joining a union; but in practice the Board feels that
such influence may never be divorced from some shadow of coercion.13
"Whenever an employer addresses himself to his employees on the subject of unionism, orally or in writing ...

economic compulsion comes

in through the 'door and freedom of speech flies out the window."'

4

Constitutionality of the order if viewed as prohibiting only those
expressions of opinion accompanied by overt coercive acts: It is not
perfectly clear whether the Board meant to prohibit the anti-union
statements of the employer only in so far as per se or by their accompaniment of hostile acts they constituted coercion, or whether they intended to forbid altogether future expression of opinion hostile to unions.
It is immediately apparent that there is a vast difference. As before
mentioned, the Board and the courts agree that the employer's freedom
of speech is constitutionally prohibitable when coercive per se, or when
unequivocally15 accompanied by other hostile activities. There seems
to have been no -decision in which the forbidden remarks were not a part
of a campaign involving other and more obviously intimidatory tactics.Y6 The courts have apparently felt that in the usual case the record
of threats, discharges, violence, and circulation of anti-union propaganda
were so interwoven as parts of a unified campaign that it would defeat
the purpose of the act to attempt to label some practices coercive and
others harmless. However, if the instant Board order be interpreted
as preventing all expressions of employer opinion, even when not accompanied by other acts of hostility, the Supreme Court is presented with
perhaps the most fundamental freedom of speech controversy since the
World War Sedition Acts. On this particular issue the arguments for
both sides are weighty.' 7
Constitutionality of the order if viewed as prohibiting all expressions
Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 54, 72, 78 (footnote 35).

14Rosenfarb,
1

cit. supra
note found
7, at 79.
In the Fordop.case,
the court
other overt activities for the purpose of

upholding the Board's order as to other features of the case, but found insufficient
accompaniment of other hostile activities to make the employer's statements
coercive 1
**..

in every case the employer's speech, written or oral, was projected on

a background of vigilantism, physical molestation of organizers, spying activities,
so-called citizens' committees, company unions, or discriminatory discharge of
union officials and union members,--in short, part of the whole paraphernalia of
guerrilla anti-unionism. In each of these cases, the Board held no more than that
the employer distribution of anti-union propaganda was so colored by the whole
factual setting of .employer coercion that the propaganda itself might properly be
considered coercive." Greene, op. cit. supra note 11, at 100.
7 The Committee on the Bill of. Rights of the American Bar Association had
voted, subject to the court's ruling in this case, to asl4 leave to file a brief amicus
curiae in an appropriate test case in the Supreme Court concerning the constitutional right of employers to express opinions adverse to unionization. Such a
brief had been filed in the circuit court, and may again be filed before the Supreme
Court if the Board's petition for certiorariis granted.
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of employer opinion even unaccompanied by overt coercive acts: An
attorney for the Board argues:
"An employer's 'opinion' about unionism expressed to his employees
is not the same as his opinion on what doctor to use or about the international situation. Power in the plant is shut off, the employees are
told to attend certain meetings and some are discharged, not for the purpose of expressing his views on the weather ...

but for the purpose of

expressing his antagonisms to unionism.... And [the workers] know
that the employer has the power to back up his 'opinions'

. .

. there is

always implicit the threat of economic compulsion if his wishes are not
heeded. The employer's 'advice' not to join a union is a command, disobedience to which entails not only frequent danger to one's anatomical
integrity but also loss of one's job ....

Freedom of speech is possible

only among those who approximate each other in equality of position."",
To this contention, the court has replied that, assuming that formerly
an employer's expression to his employees might have been coercive, the
act itself, liberally interpreted and strictly enforced, put an end to such a
possibility. In other words, the employment relationship is declared to
be immaterial, since under the act the servant no longer has occasion to
fear the master's frown of authority or threats of discrimination. To
this idealistic statement, the Board might reply: "In theory, yes; in
practice, no!"
The Board has further contended that the guarantee of the right of
self-organization would be entirely ineffectual if the employer, under the
guise of exercising his constitutional right of free speech, were free to
coerce employees into refraining from the exercise of the rights vouchsafed them by the act. They find it impossible to believe that statements
denouncing labor organizations, characterizing union leaders as insincere,
and warning employees that by joining a union they pay money for
nothing, are merely "directed to the reason of the employee", and have
no intimidatory effect. But another circuit court has declared that it
was never the intention of Congress to curtail freedom of speech or to
deprive an employer of his right to express an honest opinion.1 9 And
the principal case merely quotes from a recent Supreme Court opinion:
"To persuade others to his point of view the pleader ... at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men . . . and even to false

statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of
history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these
opinion and right
liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened
20
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."
" Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra note 7, at 78.
" Jefferson Electric v. N.L.R.B.. 102 F. (2d) 949, 956 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
"Cantwell v, Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. ed. 1213
(1940).
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Dicta of other circuit courts is indeterminative. It has been said
that "The position ...of the employer . ..carries such weight and
influence that his words may be coercive *hen they would not be so if
the relation of master and servant did not exist", but in the same
breath the court points out that the employer has a right to his views
which would be valueless unless coupled with the right to express them.21
Also opposed to the attitude of the Board is a statement from the Union
Pacific Stages decision: "It is difficult to think that Congress intended
to forbid an employer from expressing a general opinion that an employee would find it more to his advantage not to belong to a union.
Had Congress attempted so to do it would be in violation of the First
Amendment."2 2 And lastly, the very recent Midland Steel Products
case23 declares that... "Unless the right of free speech is enjoyed by
employers as well as employees, the guaranty of the First Amendment
is futile, for it is fundamental that the basic rights guaranteed by the
Constitution belong equally to every person."
Reviewability of the Board'sfindings of fact under the "substantial"
evidence rule: Section 10(f) of the act provides that the findings of the
Board as to the facts shall be conclusive, if supported by "evidence".
This has been construed to necessitate "substantial" evidence. 24 In the
present case, the circuit court declared that the Board's finding that the
words of the employer were coercive due to their context was not supported by "substantial" evidence, and that actually there were no discriminatory discharges or other overt acts of hostility of sufficient
notoriety, together with the printed words, to cause the employees to
feel any coercion. That the circuit courts have been too free in seizing
the device of "substantial" evidence to review the evidence before the
Board has been realized by the Supreme Court. Justice Black recently
decided that the failure of the court to enforce the Board's order "resulted from the substitution of its judgment on disputed facts for the
Board's judgment-and power to do that has been denied the courts
by Congress".2 5 He emphasized the idea that Congress, in setting up
the Board, sought to expedite administration by more specialized and
experienced fact-finding experts than the courts afforded. Justice
Black's criticism may well apply to the principal case, for the Board's
" N.L.R.B. v. Falk Corporation, 102 F. (2d) 383, 389 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).

" N.L.1.B. v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F. (2d) 153, 178 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938).

"Midland Steel Products v. N.L.R.B., 113 F. (2d) 800, 804 (C.C. A. 6th,

19"A,;kppalachian Electric Power v. N.L.R.B., 93 F. (2d)

(C. C. A. 4th
1938). Strict interpretation of the statute would, of course, have necessitated the
ruling that any evidence at all would conclusively support the Board's findings.
"N.L.I.B. v. Waterman Steamship Corporation, 309 U. S.206, 60 Sup. Ct.
95, 84 L. ed. 704 (1940). See also dissent by Justice Black in N.L.R.B. v. Columbian E. & S. Co., 306 U. S.292, 59 Sup. Ct. 501, 83 L. ed. 660 (1939).
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prohibitory order appears warranted by "substantial" evidence. It found
that Ford waged a unified campaign of intimidation and coercion: a
hard-pressing company union, company inspired vigilantism, systematic
discharge of pro-union employees, and finally, circulation inside the
plant of anti-union pamphlets by which the company made its antagonism to labor organizations so manifest that no employee whose economic life was at its mercy could fail to comprehend it. Here was
speech implemented by force and directly addressed to fear of physical
violence. Truly such "'speech' rode on the heels of terror and repression."' 26 For the circuit court to hold that such patent evidence revealed
no accompaniment of other coercive activities appears to have been
unwarranted.
What will be the attitude of the Supreme Court? The highest
tribunal has maintained that the constitutional guaranty of free speech
does not "protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that
have all the effect of force".2 7 To refute a contention of the Board that
the "potentiality of opinion to coerce is to be tested by whether it did
in fact coerce", the circuit court cited Hague v. C. I. 0.28 to the effect
that every expression of opinion on matters of importance had the
potentiality of inducing action in the interest of one group rather than
another, but that the group in power at any moment might not impose
penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful 'discussion of matters of public
interest merely by showing that others might thereby be persuaded to
take action inconsistent with its interests.
In Thornhill v. Alabama,29 in which a state statute prohibiting picketing was held unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declared that the
freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the Constitution embraced
at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment, and that under modern circumstances the tissemination of information concerning labor union disputes must be regarded as within
that'area of free discussion guaranteed by the Constitution. Although
this case specifically concerned freedom of speech of union members, it
has been predicted that it may open a new era of freedom for employers
as well.30
"8 Notes, (1938) 7 I. J. A. BULL. 38; (1938) 48 YAL L. J.54, 72, 75. For
the Board's account of the unfair practices of Ford, see 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 352 to
380.
87 Gomper's v. Buck's Stove & Range Company, 221 U. S.418 439 31 Sup.
Ct. 492, 55 L. ed. 797 (1911). In Aiken v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S.194, 2? Sup. Ct.
3,49 L. ed. 154 (1904), Justice Holmes said: "No conduct has such an absolute
privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The most
innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step
in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law."
28307 U. S.496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. ed. 1423 (1939).
310 U. S.88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
0 Labor Relations Reporter, Supplement (April 29, 1940).
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In consistently invalidating municipal ordinances which prohibited
the distribution of pamphlets on public streets without a permit, the
Court has said that liberty of the press extends to pamphlets and leaflets
and to all publications which afford a vehicle of information and opinion. 8 ' Following this lead, the Schneider case 32 held that the right to
house to house distribution of literature was constitutionally protected,
and that no distinction existed between giving a pamphlet to a workman at the factory gate and -delivering -one to his home.
Apparently there is no clear-cut precedent to force a particular solution upon the Supreme Court--especially upon a Court which has demonstrated no great reverence for stare decisis.33 At least four alternatives
are available. First, and most unlikely, the Court might uphold the
Board's order in toto, and declare that any expression of employer opinion hostile to labor organizations was coercive per se from the very nature
of the employer-employee relationship, and its suppression was not therefore in contravention of constitutional guaranties. But such a policy, if
originally intended, should have been clearly embodied in the act by
Congress; and had it been so embodied, the Court's traditional reluctance
to restrict basic rights, coupled with an awareness of adverse public
opinion, would logically prompt it against such a decision. A second
alternative, more deserving of consideration, would be to prohibit only
those words of the employer which were clear threats in themselves;
yet this attitude, being contrary to the Court's previous liberal treatment
of the Board, is likewise unlikely. As a third alternative, the Court
may find that the Board's deliberate use of the specific order, under the
circumstances of the case, implied that the Board intended future prohibition of speech even when free of a hostile background, and squarely
declare that such an order is unconstitutional.
Finally, and apparently the most practicable, the Supreme Court
could rule that the Board's findings of fact were supported by "substantial" evidence, and hold that the Board's order, insofar as it was
designed to prevent statements by employers when accompanied by other
anti-union activities, was valid. By this latter solution, the Court might
avoid the necessity for a direct decision upon the narrow issue so imperfectly presented here, and at the same time curb the idea spreading
among employers that the practical effect of the circuit court's ruling
was to unconditionally pave the way for employers to circulate any
hostile expression of opinion among employees by way of pamphlets
personally distributed.
CHARLES EDWIN HINSDALE.
"Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).
s'308 U. S.147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. ed. 155 (1939).
SI Erie Ry. v. Tompldns, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938);

Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed. 927 (1939) ; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. ed. 382 (1940).
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Labor Law-Wagner Act-Refusal to Hire.
X and Y while in the employ of another mill applied for work at
the Waumbec Mills, but after some discussion as to their union activity
and leadership were not hired. The National Labor Relations Board
found that but for the respondent's knowledge of their past union leadership they would have been employed. This was held to constitute an
unlawful discrimination. The company was ordered to offer them immediate employment and to pay them back wages from the time of the
discrimination to the time of the offer of employment less net earnings
-luring the period.1 On appeal the order was upheld by the Circuit
2
Court of Appeals.
Section 8(1) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act8 provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment.., to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. ' 4 The court, in upholding the board, declared that the natural meaning of this provision
would encompass applicants for employment as well as employees. Further this interpretation is consistent with the legislative history6 of the
act and consonant with its declared policy. 6 Section 10(c) of the act
provides: "If the board shall be of the opinion that the person named
in the complaint has engaged ... in any such unfair labor practices...
then . . . the board shall issue . . . an order . . . requiring such person
to cease and 'desist from such unfair labor practices, and to take such
1Waumbec Mills, Inc., 15 N.L.R.B. 37 (1939);
Note (1939) 53 HARV. L.
REv. 141.
2 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
3
Act of July 5, 1935, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §151 (Supp. 1940).
' 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158 (Supp. 1940).
'The report of the House committee on labor (H. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1935), p. 19) in referring to section 8(3) states: "The third unfair
practice prohibits an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. This spells out in greater detail the provisions of section 7(a) (N.I.R.A.) prohibiting 'yellow dog' contracts and interference with self organization. This interference may be -present in a variety of
situations in this connection, such as discrimination in discharge, lay off, demotion
or transfer, hire, forced resignation, or division of work; in reinstatement or hire
following a technical change in corporate structure, a strike, lock-out, temporary
lay-off, or a transfer of the plant." Report of Senate Committee: "But if the
right to be free from employer interference in self organization or join or refrain
from joining a labor organization is to have any practical meaning it must be
accompanied by assurance that its exercise will not result in discriminatory treatment or loss of opportunity for work." Sen. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) p. 11 (italics supplied) Note 1939 Wis. L. Rzv. 445.
6 Section 1: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain obstructions to the free flow of commerce ... by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of employment." 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§151 (Supp. 1940).
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affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this chapter." 7 To the contention that "reinstatement of employees" excluded those who were not
erhployees as defined in section 2(3) s the court answered that this clause
was illustrative rather than exclusive and that any "affirmative action"
that would effectuate the policies of the act was proper. 9 Payment of
back wages to an applicant for employment was within the scope of the
general relief which the board may order. 10
This case appears to be the first clear-cut example of entire lack of
past or present employment relationship which the board or the courts
have passed on. However, periodically from its inception the board
has compelled the hiring of those who have in the past been employees of the employer accused of discrimination"l and the courts have
passed on two of these cases reaching a result contrary to the principal
case.
The first case arose in the second circuit. 12 Several months before
the effective date of the act six men were discharged. It was not contended that it was unfair to discharge them but that discriminating
149
STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §160(c) (Supp. 1940).
"'The
term 'employee' shall include... any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because

of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment." 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §152

(3) (Supp. 1940).
Note (1939) 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1116; (1939) 27 CALIF. L. REv. 470.
'0The facts of the principal case raise an interesting question as to the affirmative action which the board may take. At the time of the discrimination these
two men had jobs with another mill some distance from their homes which was
near the Waumbec Mill. The board's order for back pay takes net earnings which
are computed by taking the actual earnings less expense on the other job which
would not have been sustained while working for the respondent. Thus the board's
order would include the expense of commuting while'they were working for the
other mill. Matter of Crossett Lumber Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 440 (1938) (Order to pay
expense of trips to other places in order to get work after discriminatory dismissal.).
Could the board order such an expense to be paid if their jobs had continued
throughout until the time of the board's order? It might depend on the board's
determination of whether the employment with the other mill is "substantially
equivalent" under the statute. Supra note 8. If it is there would be no basis for
such an order. If it is not then an order to hire should follow as in the principal
case with the expense of commuting constituting the sole back wage assuming no
other expenses. Note (1939) YALE L. J. 1265.
However, if the relief allowed in section 10(c) does not depend on the
definition of "employee" in section 2(3) then query, should the relief always
YALE. L. J. 953.
depend
1 1 on an order to reinstate or hire? Note (1940) 49
Alonquin Printing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 264 (1936) (Refusal to rehire after shutdown of plant) ; Appalachian Electric Power Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 240 (1937), rev'd
on other grounds, 93 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (Employee status previously terminated by shutdown); Montgomery Ward & Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 115
(1938) (Refusal to give further work to one who had at intervals been employed
as extra); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 325 (1938), consent decree
filed, 97 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (Refusal to rehire furloughed workers
by successor in bankruptcy) ; Cherry Cotton Mills, 11 N.L.R.B. 478 (1939) (Previous position with same employer voluntarily relinquished).
"National Casket Co. v. N.L.R.B., 107 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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against them when they applied for their old jobs (after the effective
date of the act) was an unfair practice. The court answered this contention by saying: "The purpose of the act is not to compel an employer
to hire members of one union rather than another, or union men rather
than non-union men." The employer may use any test he sees fit as to
an applicant for work but he may not impose by the contract of employment any limitation in respect to union or anti-union activities during
the term of employment. This would seem to be no more than a reiteration of the policy against the "yellow dog" contract.18 The court
seems to see a result inimical to the policies of the act in ordering the
hiring of a union applicant because it will necessarily follow that the
board may upon occasion have to order the hiring of a non-union applicant as a result of the provision that the employer shall neither discourage or encourage unionization save in the manner specified in the
act, i.e., enter into a dosed shop agreement under the provisions of the
act. 4 This reasoning is used to bolster the idea that there is a distinction
between employees and applicants for employment but it is hard to see
how that result should bring any such distinction. If the literal terms
of the act are followed the board should enforce the rights of a nonunion man when there is discrimination, although this situation is not
likely to arise.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Learned Hand reserves the question
of whether these men should have been hired if they were strangers and
says that they were employees according to the definition given that
word by the act. He concluded that their work had ceased as a consequence of a labor dispute15 and even though prior to the effective
date of the act they were still employees after the effective date of the
act. He says that the question turns on how the courts apply the definition of the word "employee" and that the language and purpose of the
act would include these men: ". . . the line between them and the others
[who lose their job after the act has become effective] is purely adventitious and without basis in any stateable policy; and I cannot doubt
what Congress would have done, had the situation been presented to it."
In the other case46 involving the point the court merely refused to
" Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 50-HAav. L. REv. 1071.

.. nothing in this chapter . . . shall preclude an employer from making
an agreement with a labor organization . ., to require as a condition of employment therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees (as
provided by the act)," 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158(3) (Supp. 1940).
' "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure
or condition of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee." 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C.A.
§152(9) (Supp. 1940).
' Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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execute the order for reinstatement for two of the men involved where
it was found that they had not been employees under the circumstances.
Two judges of the three judge court relied on the case discussed above
as authority. Judge Learned Hand concurring, because he felt bound
by the prior decision, said: "If I were free to decide, I should hold that
it was an 'unfair labor practice' to discriminate against anyone whether
an 'employee' or not. Section eight has five subdivisions and two of
them-two and three--do not use the word. Moreover, not only does
the text for that reason not require that these subdivisions shall be limited to employees, but the predominant purpose of the act as a whole
requires an opposite construction. One can as effectively interfere with
the rights which section 71' secures by refusing to hire as by discharging; that is, unless we interpret 'employees' .in section 7, as limited to
persons actually employed at the moment, which would certainly mutilate the act. Nor am I moved by the argument that the employer must
be free to hire whom he will. The whole purpose is to limit his liberty
so far as its exercise may invade the new rights created; and I can see
no greater limitation in denying him the power to discriminate in hiring
than in discharging."
The Supreme Court has not passed on this problem. There is language in National Labor Relations Board v. McKay Radio & Tel. Co.' 8
which might mean that they uphold reinstatement in National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.19 as a reasonable regulation of existing contractual relationships. If this is true then the Supreme Court will still have the constitutional question of freedom of
contract to consider. However, the authority of the cases declaring it
unconstitutional to make it a misdemeanor for an employer to require
21
a "yellow dog" contract as a condition of employment" is now doubted.
22
The court in a recent decision said that section 8(3) of the act is
"... not limited so as to outlaw discrimination only where there is in
existence a formal contract or relation of employment between employer
and employee. They embrace, as well all elements of the employment
relationship which in fact customarily attend employment and with re""Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S.
C. A. §157 (Supp. 1940).
'0 N.L.R.B. v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, 347, 58 Sup. Ct.. 904,
911, 82 L. ed. 1381, 1391 (1938).
I N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81
L. ed.
893 (1937).
2
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. ed. 441 (1915);
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436 (1908).
" See note 13, supra; Note (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 816.
" N.L.R.B. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 60 Sup. Ct. 493, 84 L. ed.

704 (1940).
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spect to which an employer's discrimination may as readily be the means
of interfering with employee's right of self organization as if these
elements were precise terms of a written contract of employment."
Precedent for ordering two strangers to contract with each other is
found where refusal to contract will result in a monopoly under the
Sherman act,2 3 where states have ordered a vessel coming into harbor

to take the first pilot to apply or pay him his wages, 24 and where an
employer was ordered to take out insurance for his employees. 25
If an employer is allowed to discriminate in this fashion considering
it in the light of effect, it would seem that the discrimination against
the stranger is only incidental to the result engendered. Discrimination
in such case would relate to all the employees of this particular employer. It would be extremely coercive when they realized that the moment the contract relation was legitimately terminated the employer
might apply any criterion he saw fit in rehiring. Since the board is
given the general power to take affirmative action with only the limitation that it effectuate the policies of the act it would seem that the order
in the principal case was justified. The effect of an order to hire plus
payment of wages which would have been earned will be to negate the
discrimination and restore the condition which existed prior to such
26

discrimination.

A final result along the lines laid down in the instant case would
give effective aid to the generally inept 27 blacklisting statutes.28 It would
2 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S.
600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951, 58 L. ed. 1490 (1914) ; Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters,
260 U. S. 501, 43 Sup. Ct. 167, 67 L. ed. 369 (1923).
" Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall 236, 20 L. ed. 624 (U. S. 1871); Perkins v.
O'Mahoney, 131 Mass. 546 (1881).
'5 N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 667
(1917).
"' The definitive interpretation of this section by the Supreme Court limits it
to "remedial, not punitive (action) . . . to be exercised in and of the board's auConsolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305
thority to restrain violation. . .-"
U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L., ed. 131 (1938); N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co., 306 U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 83 L. ed. 627 (1939). This section
was taken largely from the experience of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. A.
§§151-163. In the course of administering that act it had been found that efficient
protection of labor's right to organize demanded increased legal sanction. In the
course of events, a federal equity court ordered a railroad, which was in contempt
for refusing to obey an order to respect its employees' right to organize, to purge
such contempt by rehiring several persons discharged for union membership.
That act itself did not provide for such an order; it was an invention of the court
as a reasonable means for enforcing the employer's duty of non-interference with
self-organization of employees. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Texas & N. 0. Ry.,
24 F. (2d) 426 (S. D. Texas, 1928). The legislative history of the act indicates
that it was used to prevent or remedy injury to the public rather than to punish
the employer. H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
27Until 1933 only two criminal prosecutions and less than twelve civil suits
against blacklisting had been successful. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1933), 390.
28 See note 21, supra.
statutes.

Thirty-five states now have some form of blacklisting
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lay at rest any doctrinaire question on freedom of contract for the purpose of the act, thus allowing it to be administered freely.2 9 Its main
effectiveness should be to convince employers that the sooner they
recognize and fully appreciate the policies for which the act stands
the sooner that modicum of peace may be reached which is possible
when employees and employers sit down at the conference table and
deal as equals. The employer who accepts the law as it is in this
situation will remove the stigma which attaches to one who is continually opposing his employees as to their right to organize and he
should find that he still has the normal power to hire and fire. The practical result of refusal will be that he is apt to have somewhat less than
that normal power where the board is able to amass copious evidence as
to his opposition to the act3" even where he has a right to oppose upon
some such doctrine as freedom of speech 3 1
ROBERT CRAIG MCINNES.
Torts-Charitable Institutions-Effect of Liability Insurance.
Plaintiff, injured 'by falling on slippery hallway at defendant
Y. W. C. A., while there to receive paid swimming lessons, brought
an action for damages resulting from the fall, alleging negligence in
allowing the hallway to be in a dark, damp, and slippery condition.
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant was insured against such liability. On motion of the defendant,' the court struck out as irrelevant
the allegations as to insurance, and ruled that the institution, being a
charitable one, was not liable to beneficiaries for the negligence of its
agents or employees where it had exercised reasonable care in their
2
selection and retention. Held, judgment affirmed.
That a Y. W. C. A. or, a Y. M. C. A. is a charitable institution of a
public nature is now clearly recognized. 3 The mere fact that it is not
almsgiving in character, is not controlling. Charity in the legal sense
is not confined to the relieving of poverty and distress, but has assumed
a wider significance which embraces the improvement and promotion
of the happiness and well-being of mankind. 4 Furthermore, the fact
that its privileges are restricted in part to its members does not change
' Magruder, supra note 13, at 1106.
'o Daykin, The Employers Right to Discharge Under the Wagner Act (1939)
24 IOwA L. REv. 660.
" Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 72.
1
Pursuant to North Carolina Statutes providing for striking irrelevant or
redundant evidence. N. C. CODm ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§510, 537.
'Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940).
3
Eads v. Y. W. C. A., 325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930); Bruce v.
Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929); Betts v. Y. M. C. A., 83 Pa.
Super. 545 (1924).
' Andrews v. Y. M. C. A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (1939) ; Sanitarium

v. Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91 N. E. 385 (1910).
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its status as a public charity, since the privilege of membership is open
to all, without restriction other than sex and age. 5
Ordinarily, the payment of a fee by one served by the charity has
no effect upon the eleemosynary character of the institution. 6 However,
if, although organized as a charity, the institution makes a profit from
total receipts from patients, over and above the cost of maintenance,
then it loses its charitable immunity.7 The principal case seems undoubtedly correct in holding that the plaintiff's paying for the swimming
lessons had no effect on the liability of the charity, since the nominal
fee charged by no means reimbursed the Y. W. C. A. for the benefits
received.
Charities have long been favored by the law. Various theories have
been advanced by courts as attempted explanations for the partial or complete non-liability of charities for torts of their employees. 8 It is significant that all of the following theories for restricting the liability of
charities for torts of their employees have met with disapproval, both
by courts favoring liability and by courts which, while favoring exemption, have adopted a theory acceptable to the particular court and dismissed the others as unsatisfactory: (1) The trust fund established by
the benefactors of the charity may not be diverted from the purpose for
which it was set apart. 9 (2) One who accepts the benefits of a char'Little v. Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 96 N. E. 1032 (1912).
o "Better facilities for the care, cure, and treatment of the sick, both of the
poor, and of those who are able to pay are secured by the establishment of
(charities). These facilities are increased by the receipt of money from those
who are able to pay in whole or in part for the benefits received." Downs v.
Hospital, 101 Mich, 555, 560, 60 N. W. 42, 43 (1894) ; Powers v. 'Hospital, 109
Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901); Parks v. University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991
(1905); Schloendorff v. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); Green
v. Biggs, 167 N. C. 417, 83 S. E. 553 (1914); Hospital v. Thompson, 116 Va.
101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914).
SMulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonissenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699

(1920).
' In what has been accepted as the leading article on this subject, Mr. Carl
Zollman writes: "... the cases on this subject present an almost hopelessly tangled
mass of reason and unreason such as is not often encountered in the law ...
The question is one on which the courts have been fertile in drawing subtile distinctions, many of them irrelevant to the point for discussion, or, at least, leading
to no principle by which the conclusions reached can be reconciled. Many of the
opinions rest on reasons or grounds which may well be challenged as fallacious."
Zollman, Damage Liability of Caritable Institations (1921) 19 MicH. L. REv.
395, 408.
' Reasons given are: To allow recovery for tort out of the trust funds is to
allow the trustees to do indirectly that which they cannot do directly. To allow
such diversion might well result in the destruction of the charity, both by exhausting the funds, and by making potential benefactors unwilling to set up funds
which might be so destroyed. This theory was first stated in the United States
in McDonald v. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876). That case was decided on a
misapprehension of the law, in that, although the Massachusetts court based its
decision on the case of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507 (1848), that
English case did not involve a tort claim, and furthermore, the principle upon
which it had been decided had already been overruled in the House of Lords by
Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, (1866) L. R. 1 H. L. 93. The absurd end reached by
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247

itable institution thereby impliedly waives any claim for damages or
impliedly contracts to exempt the charity from any liability for the
negligence of its employees. 10 (3) The doctrine of respondeat superior
is inapplicable to charitable institutions. 1
(4) Public policy extends
either total or partial non-liability to charitable institutions. 12 A leading
the application of this doctrine is illustrated by Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113 (1923), in which recovery was denied absolute
strangers to the charity when its ambulance was negligently allowed to run over
the curbing and strike them while they were walking on the sidewalk. In its true
application, as that case shows, the trust-fund theory denies recovery for tort to
servants and strangers as well as to beneficiaries of the charity. The criticism
heaped upon the courts applying this theory is emphasized in Putnam Memorial
Hospital v. Allen, 34 F. (2d) 927 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), in which the court calls
it a "monstrous doctrine," saying that "no adequate reason . .. can be advanced
for allowing the purpose of the settlor of trust funds to introduce-into the law a
principle which . . . appears so anomalous and so unjust." As a result of such
criticism, some courts have limited the trust-fund theory to exempting charities
from tort liability only to beneficiaries. See Parks v. University, 281 Ill. 381,
75 N. E. 991 (1905). However, such a refusal to apply this theory to its fullest
extent reveals its weakness-that it -proves too much. Many courts have discarded
it entirely, to bring forth new theories of non-liability.
" In Powers v. Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901) the oft quoted
illustration was given, that "it would be intolerable that a good Samaritan, who
takes to his home a wounded stranger for surgical care, should be held personally
liable for the negligence of his servant in caring for that stranger," and that
"One who accepts (such) benefits . .. enters into a relation -which exempts his
benefactor from liability for the negligence of his servants. . .

."

The usual

criticism of this theory is that it hardly seems applicable to those cases where the
beneficiary does not comprehend the situation, as where he is temporarily unconscious, in a demented condition, too young to understand, or simply has no knowledge of legal principles. See Gamble v. University, 138 Tenn. 616, 20W S. W. 510
(1918); and Zollman, supra note 8, at 407. Nevertheless, many courts continue
to follow this theory, realizing and accepting it as a fiction. Many courts so holding require that the charity use ordinary care in the selection of its employees.
See Brice v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929).
" Hearnes v. Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895) holds that a charity
"does not come within the main reason for the rule of public policy, which supports the doctrine of respondeat superior. It derives no benefit from what its
servant does, in the sense of that personal and private gain which was the real
reason for the rule:' See also Railroad v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 367 (C. C. A.
8th, 1894). In Note (1910) 58 U. OF PA. L. REv. 426, 428, this theory is criticized.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is not based on benefit or profit. One who
undertakes the performance of a duty is liable for his negligence or that of his
employees in such -performance, even though his motive in undertaking the duty
is charitable. The theory is also weak in that, logically, it goes further than most
courts are willing to go, since it exempts the charity from liability to strangers
as well as beneficiaries. As to this, Mr. Zollman says "A charity thus freed from
legal restraint instead of being a blessing might very well -become a curse:'
Zollman, supra note 8, at 406.
A recent extension of the above theory,' which has been applied mainly in
exempting charitable hospitals from liability, is that, once the charity has exercised due care in selection of its physicians, surgeons, and their helpers, it is relieved of further responsibility for their actions, on the theory that they are not,
in the true sense, servants of the charity. It is said that they are not under the
direction of the charity, but become and remain the servants of the patient as long
as they remain in attendance upon him. See Schloendorff v. Hospital, 211 N. Y.
125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. 120
(1912). Although this extension of the above theory has met with approval by
some authorities, it seems that it is subject to the same objections that have been
made2 to the waiver theory, supra.
" It has been held that it is better for the individual to suffer injury without
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authority on Trusts suggests that the true reason for -denying recovery
is a belief on the part of the courts that many tort claims against charities
are unfounded, although the one asserting injury is able to gather evidence in his behalf; and thus principles of non-liability are1 3imposed to
prevent the plaintiff from getting before a sympathetic jury.
The courts, as seen above, disagree as to the grounds upon which
non-liability should be placed. More important, there is conflict as to
just how far charities should be exempt from the normal liability of a
master for torts of his servant. Mr. Zollman summarizes the status
quo as follows: "A number of states have, following English dicta, exempted charities from all tort liability against beneficiaries as well as
others on the ground that public policy demands that the trust fund be
not diverted to pay damages. The great majority of the courts, however, do justice to employees, strangers, and invitees by holding the
charity to the same degree of care exacted from other entities. In regard to beneficiaries they hold the charity liable for injuries resulting
from the negligence of the trustees or managers in selecting incompetent14
servants, but not for the negligence of servants carefully selected."'
There now seems to be a growing sentiment and trend, especially by
writers, in favor' of holding charities to the same degree of tort liability
as non-charitable institutions, as to all persons. 5
compensation than for the public to be deprived of the benefit of charities. In
organized society the rights of the individual must, in some instances, be subordinated to the -public good. Vermillion v. College, 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649
(1916). Underlying all the theories of non-liability, is said to be this matter of
public policy. "A policy of the law which prevents him who accepts the benefit
of a charity from suing it for the torts of its agents and servants . . . carries on
its face its own justification, and, without the aid of metaphysical reasoning,
commends itself to the wisdom of mankind." Ettlinger v. Trustees, 31 F. (2d)
869 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929). See also Duncan v. Association, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W.
1120 (1912). However, it has been just as vigorously argued that tort immunity
should not be granted to charities in addition to the many special privileges which
they receive from the courts and the legislatures. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(1935) §401. The institution, whose negligent servant injures an inmate so that
he may become a burden on society, has failed to carry out the purposes for which
the public policy supports charities. So it might be that public policy would better
be served by imposing liability in such cases, for such a move would tend to
increase efficiency and benefit the public as well as the persons so injured. "It is
almost contradictory to hold that an institution organized to dispense charity
shall be charitable and extend aid to others, but shall not compensate or aid
those injured by it in carrying on its activities." Geiger v. Church, 174 Minn.
1_3 Scon', TRUSTS (1939) §402.
389, 219 N. W. 463 (1928).
" Zollman, supra n6te 8, at 412. For collections of cases, see Notes (1921)
14 A. L. R. 572, (1923) 23 A. L. R. 923, (1924) 30 A. L. P_ 455, (1924) 33
A. L. R 1369, (1926) 42 A. L. P_ 971, (1929) 62 A. L. R. 724, (1937) 109
A. L. R. 1199; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §401; see Appleman, The
Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 48, for comprehensive survey of holdings of all individual states on this problem, and the theories
upon which the courts proceed.
15 Glavin v. Hospital, 12 R. 1. 411 (1879), although later specifically overruled
by statute in that state, is the leading case for this spreading idea. Therein, pp.
425-426, it was said: "The public is doubtless interested in the maintenance of a
...public charity . . . ; but it also has an interest in obliging every person and
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In the principal case, North Carolina continues its adherence to the
doctrine of partial immunity approved by the majority of jurisdictions.16
The closely allied cases of Green v. Biggs17 and Hoke v. Glenn18 decided
that, as to beneficiaries,a charity is not liable for the torts of its servants
or agents when due care has been exercised in their selection or retention. In the latter case, Justice Allen, after adverting to all the theories
of liability and non-liability, says "We prefer to adopt the middle course,
which exempts from liability for the negligence of employees and
requires the exercise of ordinary care in selecting them, as more consonant with . . . the purposes for which such institutions are established." 19 The scope of the North Carolina rule is indicated in Cowans
v. Hospitals2° where an employee of a charity was allowed recovery for
negligent injury. It logically follows therefrom that charities in this
state would also be liable to strangers to the charity. For no case has
been found in which a jurisdiction has allowed tort recovery to employees
of a charity and then denied similar recovery to strangers to the charity.
North Carolina has not seen fit to base its "middle course" on any
definite theory. However, it appears evident that the court has been
strongly persuaded by the argument of public policy, for in Hoke v.
Glenn it is said: "The beneficiaries of charitable institutions are the
poor, who have very little opportunity for selection, and it is the purpose of the founders to give to them skillful and humane treatment. If
they are permitted to employ those who are incompetent and unskilled,
funds bestowed for beneficence are diverted from their true purpose,
every corporation which undertakes the performance of a duty to perform it

carefully, and to that extent, therefore, it has an interest against exempting any
such person and any such corporation from liability for its negligences. The
court cannot undertake to say that the former interest is so supreme that the
latter must be sacrificed to it. Whether it shall -be or not is not a question for
the court, but for the legislature."
If the charity is to be so continuously negligent as to have its treasury depleted
by a series of law suits, is it not in the public interest to have it dissolved? In
Gtiger v. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463 (1928) it was said that charities
"are generally favored by being relieved, partly or wholly, from the burden of
taxation. We do not think it would be good public policy to relieve them from

liability for torts or negligence." For further amplification of this theory of
non-exemption, see 2 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) §401. Also, in New
Hampshire, complete recovery is allowed against charities the same as all other
corporations, the courts stating that the legislature should determine the policy of
exemption from liability as to tort, if any is to exist. 'Hewett v. Hospital, 73 N. H.
556, 64 Atl. 190 (1906) ; Welch v. Hospital, 9 A. (2d) 761 (N. H. 1939).
"This rule of partial immunity is approved by the American Law Institute.
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §402.

1167 N. C. 417, 83 S. E. 553 (1914). This rule was earlier stated in North
Carolina in Barden v. Coast Line Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910) ; but in
that case the court became involved in another problem, and this and the following
case contain superior reasoning and -better statements of the rule.
18 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914).
Id.
83 S.
197 at
N. 597,
C. 41,
147E.S. atE.809.
672 (1929).
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and, under the form of a charity, they become a menace to those for
'2 1
whose benefit they are established."
The effect of the existence of liability insurance on the right of a
beneficiary to recover from a charity is widely debated. The principal
case follows long established North Carolina doctrine that evidence of
liability insurance is ordinarily incompetent.2 2 As a general rule the
existence of liability insurance may not be shown for the purpose of
creating liability where none existed previously.23 A great majority of
courts have applied this rule to charities, generally saying that if a
trustee is allowed indirectly to create liability or waive an exemption
by procuring indemnity insurance, the protection afforded charities
would be virtually destroyed.24 No reasons are given for such a view;
but fear probably exists that if the partial exemption which remains for
charitable institutions is forfeited where liability insurance exists, the
wall of public policy which affords exemption will be weakened until
eventually charities lose all immunity.
-On the other hand, such argument by no means disposes of those
cases in which exemption is justified on the grounds of public policy
(and it has been said that this public interest underlies all theories of
partial or total exemption). North Carolina apparently denies recovery
to a tortiously injured beneficiary on the ground that public policy favors
keeping the charity intact. Such being the case, it seems that where
liability insurance exists the reasons for exempting charitable institutions have disappeared, at least to the extent that recovery would be
covered by such insurance. For it is admittedly a public policy that
charities should be just before being generous-this has simply been
21167
N. C. 594, 597, 83 S.E. 807, 809 (1914).
22

In a very similar case (decided on -procedural points), Duke v. Comm'r, 214
N. C. 570, 199 S.E. 918 (1938), in which beneficiary brought action for tort of
employee of charity and alleged that recovery would not impair or diminish the
trust property since the defendant carried liability insurance, the supreme court
reversed the ruling of the lower court denying defendant's motion to strike evidence of insurance. The supreme court said that the same was entirely foreign
to the case and incompetent. As to incompetence of evidence of liability insurance
in general in such cases, see Lytton v. Mfg. Co., 157 N. C. 331, 72 S.E. 1055
(1911) ; Starr v. Oil Co., 165 N. C. 587, 81 S.E. 776 (1914) ; Holt v. Mfg. Co.,
177 N. C. 170, 98 S.E. 369 (1919) ; Stanley v. Lumber Co., 184 N. C. 302, 114
S. E. 385 (1922) ; Bryant v. Furniture Co., 186 N. C. 441, 119 S. E. 823 (1923) ;
Allen v. Garibaldi, 187 N. C. 798, 123 S. E. 66 (1924); Fulcher v. Lumber Co.,
191 N. C. 408, 132 S.E. 9 (1926) ; Luttrell v. Harding, 193 N. C. 266, 136 S. E,
726 (1927); Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756 (1936). See also
White
v. McCabe, 208 N. C. 301, 180 S.E. 704 (1935).
222 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE (3rd ed. 1940) §2 82a.
2Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925); Williams,
Adm'x. v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753 (1928); Enman v.
Trustees, 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930); McKay v. Morgan Memorial, 272
Mass. 121, 172 N. E. 68 (1930) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss.
676, 126 So. 465 (1930); McLeod v. Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95. S.W. (2d) 917
(1936).
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held subordinate to the policy that, because of their value to the public,
charities should be kept intact.
A desirable solution where insurance exists is reached in Colorado 5
and Tennessee, 26 whose courts rule that non-liability extends no further
than necessary to protect the charitable trust from diversion; so that a
tort judgment may be allowed against the institution, though only to
be satisfied to the extent of the insurance, which will not affect or
deplete the trust property.2 7 Such a view is more consonant with progressive decisions permitting the existence of liability insurance to re28
move like disabilities, created by public policy, in other fields.
HARvEy

A.

JONAS, JR.

Wages and Hours Law-Concurrent jurisdiction of State and
Federal Courts Under Section 16(b).
GENERAL SCOPE

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,1 commonly known as the

Wage and Hour Law, has given rise to confusion as to the proper
O'Connor v. Ass'n., 96 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939).

'

27 University

v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
It has been suggested that some difficulty might be met in satisfying such a
judgment where the policy is one of "loss" rather than "liability" insurance. An
eminent authority on trusts says, as to this problem: "Although without express
statements to such an effect, a policy for general indemnity might be interpreted
as to save harmless from such. claims as could be enforced against it if it were
not a charitable institution." 3 Scorr, TRUSTS (1939) §402.
The courts have not yet been faced with the problem of the effect, on the trust
fund, of increasing insurance rates caused by the imposition of ordinary liability
on charities carrying insurance.
8 In the analagous field of parent-child relationships, the general rule is that
no action may be maintained against the parent, by a minor child, for a personal
tort. Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1157, (1931) 71 A. L. R. 1071. A new trend is
shown, however, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930) (favorably commented on in Note (1930) 15 MINN . L. Rv. 126) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.
Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932) (decision called "as logical as it is laudable" in
Note (1933) 11 N. C. L. Ray. 352; see favorable comment also in Note (1932)
33 CoL. L. Rv. 360) ; and Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. (2d) 343 (1939)
(which is said to be "in line with a growing tendency to allow recovery where
an insurance company will ultimately bear the loss", in Note (1939) 26 VA. L.
REv. 235). In all of these cases recovery was allowed for tort of parent where
there was liability insurance in existence. Admittedly, this is a new development
in the law. The general rule, and that followed by N. C, remains that the
slightest intimation of the existence of liability insurance in such a case may be
grounds for mistrial (Lytton ir.
Mfg. Co., 157 N. C. 331, 72 S. E. 1055 (1911),
and that, certainly, it will not remove exemption from liability. For a review
of this subject in N. C, see Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12
(1923) in which a child was denied recovery, even though liability insurance
existed, for injuries resulting from negligent driving of her parent. There, in a
searching and vigorous dissent, Justice Clark urged that the insurance company
be not allowed to hide behind the "camouflage" that the suit is against the parent;
that "It is the essential function of courts to administer justice ... they should not
hesitate to overrule a precedent to attain that end when it has not become a rule
of property."
252 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §201 (Supp. 1940).
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courts in which to institute employee actions provided for by the act.
The section relating to jurisdiction of employee suits is as follows:
"Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 6 or Section 7
of this act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the
amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as .the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained
in any court of competent jurisdiction2 by any one or more employees
for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent
or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated."3 This will hereafter be referred to as
Section 16(b).
The wording of the statute that such suits may be maintained "in
any court of competent jurisdiction" has been variously construed. The
federal courts have been fairly consistent in assuming jurisdiction regardless of the amount involved or whether diversity of citizenship
existed. 4 These courts decided that the Fair Labor Standards Act was
legislation for the regulation of interstate commerce. Thus, the federal
courts have jurisdiction under the provision of the Judicial Code creating
an exemption to the requirement of minimum sum involved in cases
arising under laws regulating interstate commerce.5 Diversity of citizenship is not necessary when the suit arises under the Constitution or
laws of the United States. 6 However, one federal court arrived at the
conclusion that the act was not a law regulating commerce in the jurisdictional sense." The court held that the employee's suit was not of the
class attributable to some violation of an act designed to regulate commerce and, therefore, did not come under the provision of the Judicial
Code that the cases above relied on. In this case, jurisdiction was also
denied on the ground that the suit was not one to enforce a criminal
penalty provided for by an act of Congress and, thus, not within the
general grant to federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction to enforce such
penalties.
A greater variety of opinion exists as to whether state courts have
jurisdiction over employee actions. In the case of Anderson v.
2 Italics supplied.
STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §216(b) (Supp. 1940).
'Rogers v. Glazer, 32 F. Supp. 990 (W. D. Mo. 1940); Gates v. Graham

152

Ice Cream Co., 31 F. Supp. 854 (D.
Supply Co., 32 F. Supp. 567 (D. N.
460 (E. D. Pa. 1940); Campbell v.
(N. D. Texas 1940); see Ricciardi

Neb. 1940); Lengel v. Newark Newsdealers'
J. 1940); Fishman v. Marcouse, 32 F. Supp.
Superior Delcalcominia Co., 31 F. Supp. 663
v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956,

957 (D.N. J. 1940).
138 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(8) (1927).
136 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(1) (1927).
'Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 32 F. Supp. 19 (E. D. Tenn. 1940).
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Meacham,8 the Georgia court held that the suit was one for a penalty
over which only the federal courts have jurisdiction. A New York
inferior court' held the suit was not one for a penalty, following the
case of Cox v. Lykes Bros.,10 which arose under a similar act, and also
supported its conclusion on the fact that Congress denominated the
recovery as "liquidated damages". In comparison with this, another
inferior court of the same state1 ' said that it was immaterial whether
the suit was for a penalty or not because their interpretation of "in any
court of competent jurisdiction" gave that court the right to try the
case. To the same effect was an unreported case in the Chancery Court
of Tennessee' 2 where jurisdiction was assumed since no reason could
be seen for the use of the terminology in the act unless it was meant to
confer jurisdiction on the state courts. Unreported cases in Minnesota,'"
Alabama,' 4 Tennessee,' 5 and New Jersey 16 inferior courts have found
no penalty involved. However, an inferior court of another circuit in
Alamaba 17 came to the opposite result as did similar courts of Texasi
and Florida.' 9 The North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "We take
it that there is no question as to the jurisdiction to sue in the state
court. ' 20 Jurisdiction was assumed to have been unquestionably granted.
In Campbell v. Superior Delcalcominia Co., 2 a federal case, the court
implied that it believed the state courts also had jurisdiction by saying
that the fact that the suit could have been brought in the state court did
not preclude a suit in the federal court. The option was for the benefit
of the laborer.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet passed on this phase
of the act. Consequently, in the light of the uncertainty which seems
to exist, the average practitioner is at a loss as to whether to bring such
action in the state or federal court. If he tries the former, success will
be problematical since in some states the inferior court 9f one circuit
has held one way while the equivalent court of another circuit has held
otherwise.
88 S. E. (2d) 459 (Ga. 1940). The court also found that the defendant was
within one of the exemptions to the act.
'Moreno v. Picardy Mills, Inc., 173 Misc. 528, 17 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 848
(1939)-.
10 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 226 (1924).
" Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531, 17 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
1940).
851 1 (Sup.
v. Price-Bass
Co., Tenn. Chancery Ct.
Tapp Ct.,
Minn. District Ct.Circuit Ct.
House v. McKeown,Foundry
Co., Ala.
Forsyth v. Central
Son, Tenn. Circuit Ct. of Law.
v.
Jackson
&
" Johnson
18
Eichorn v. Kilkenny, N. J. Ct. of Common Pleas.

"

1"

'1 Bazanos v. Cudahy Packing Co., Ala. Circuit Ct.

Stringer v. Griffin Grocery Co., Texas County Ct.
"Duval v. Florida Light & Power Co., Florida Circuit Ct.
20 Hart v. Gregory, 218 N. C. 184, 189, 10 S. E. (2d) 644, 647 (1940).
" 31 F. Supp. 663 (N. D. Texas 1940).
18
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It is, therefore, the purpose and scope of this comment to endeavor
to clear up the uncertainty by showing not only that it was the intent
of Congress to confer jurisdiction on both federal and state courts under
this act, but that it effectively did so.
STATE COURTS HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF SUITS TO ENFORCE

RIGHTS GROWING OUT OF LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
Any impression that only United States courts have exclusive juris-

diction of suits of a civil nature arising out of or under federal laws is
erroneous. Such restriction is applicable to criminal penalties for violations of the laws of the United States.22 As will be shown hereinafter,
the action under Section 16(b) is not an action for a criminal penalty.
Assuming the action is civil, it is a principle not open to question that
unless Congress specifically restricts jurisdiction to the United States,
courts, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil
nature, arising out of or under federal laws. The rule was enunciated at
an early date in Claflin v. Houseman where it was said: "If an act of
Congress gives a penalty (meaning civil and remedial) to a party
aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no
reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some
act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a
state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws is no
reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to the

laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these

as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws. ....23
This doctrine of dual jurisdiction has uniformly been approved and
24
followed.
Conceding that state courts have jurisdiction to enforce rights and

liabilities arising under federal laws where there is no express grant of
jurisdiction, then a fortiori, they have jurisdiction of actions under Section 16(b) of the act which specifically confers jurisdiction upon all
courts of "competent jurisdiction".
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OF SUITS ARISING

UNDER ANY LAW REGULATING COMMERCE REGARDLESS OF
THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE PARTIES OR THE VALUE
OF THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY
Jurisdiction is expressly conferred upon district courts of all suits

arising under the laws of the United States regulating commerce, re2242 STAT. 635 (1922), 28 U. S. C. A. §371 (1928).
-393 U. S. 130, 136, 23 L. ed. 833, 838 (1876).

24

Mondou v. New York, New 'Haven & Hartford R. R., 233 U. S. 1, 32 Sup.

Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327 (1912) ; Missouri ex rel. St. Louis B. & M. Ry. v. TarIor,
266 U. S.200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47, 69 L. ed. 247 (1924); Grubb v. Public Uti ities
Commission, 281 U. S.470, 50 Sup. Ct. 374, 74 L. ed. 972 (1940).
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gardless of the citizenship of the parties or the value of the matter in
controversy. Section 41 of the Judicial Code2 5 provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: (1) of all suits of a
civil nature, at common law or in equity ... where the matter in con-

troversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of
$3000, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. .

. The foregoing provisions as to the sum or value of the

matter in controversy shall not be construed to apply to any of the
cases mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section." One of
the succeeding paragraphs is paragraph (8), which provides: "Suits
under insterstate commerce laws. .

.

. Of all suits and proceedings

arising under any law regulating commerce." 26 It is to be noted that
diversity of citizenship is not required where the suit arises under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
In the absence of a decision of the United States Supreme Court
that the act is a valid and constitutional exercise by Congress of the
power to regulate commerce, it can only be a matter of opinion that it is.
However, it does not seem that this contention can seriously be -denied
in view of the decisions of federal courts so holding.27 The recent liberal tendency of the Supreme Court to give a very broad construction to
the word "commerce" is also to be considered as giving effect to the
validity of this act. 28 The findings of Congress 29 and the declaration
of policy by that body30 as well as the substantive provisions of the act
show undoubtedly that the act was intended to be passed under the
commerce power.
STATE COURTS

ARE COURTS OF

COMPETENT JURISDICTION WITHIN
THE PURVIEW OF THE ACT

(A) Congressional Records Show an Intention to Confer
Jurisdiction upon State and Federal Courts Alike.
The original Black-Connery Bill,31 as introduced in both houses of
Congress on May 24, 1937, contained provisions giving to an employee
a right to sue for the difference between what was due and what had
been paid him. These sections did not specifically designate the court
1136 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(1) (1927).
-38
STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S.C.A.§41(8) (1927).
7
0pp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.Administrator of Wage & Hour Division, 111 F.
(2d) 23 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) ; Andrews v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 30 F. Supp.
380 (N. V. Ill. 1939); United States v.Walters Lumber Co., 32 F. Supp. 65
(S. D. Fla. 1940) ; Jacobs v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 33 F. Supp. 206 (W. D.

La. 1940).

" National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup.
Ct. 2615,
L. ed.
893(1938),
(1937). 29 U. S. C. A. §202(a)
52 81
STAT.
1060
(Supp. 1940).
30 52 STAT.1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §202(b) (Supp. 1940).
"x81. CoNG. Ric. 4961, 4998 (1937).
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or courts which should have jurisdiction of such actions, but Section
26 of the bill contained a provision expressly conferring such jurisdiction
upon state and federal courts: "The district courts of the Uinted States
shall have jurisdiction of violations of this act or orders thereunder,
and, concurrently with state and territorial courts, of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by or
to enjoin any violation of, this act or the regulations or orders thereunder." The section on jurisdiction of the courts remained the same in
the bill passed by the Senate on July 31, 1937.32
The provisions regarding employee suits and jurisdiction remained
virtually unchanged in subsequent bills presented to the House until
February 18, 1938, when a bill was presented which omitted any provision for employee suits. However, Section 26 of the original BlackConnery Bill, dealing with jurisdiction of courts, was not changed.
A bill presented to the House on April 13, 1938, amended the provision regarding jurisdiction so as to read: "The district courts of the
United States and the United States courts of the Territories shall have
jurisdiction for cause shown, and subject to the provisions of section
17 ... to restrain violations of section 13." It will be noted that this

section of the bill was substantially the same as Section 17 of the act as
finally enacted. This bill, as so amended, was passed by the House on
May- 24, 1938.
Thus, the situation before the conference committee of the two houses
with respect to employee suits and jurisdiction was briefly as follows:
The Senate bill provided for suits by employees and conferred jurisdiction of such suits upon federal and state courts; the House bill made
no provision for employee suits and simply conferred jurisdiction upon
federal courts to enjoin violations.
On June 14, 1938, the conference committee presented a report which
contained Sections 16 and 17 of the act as subsequently enacted. 83
An examination of the legislative history of the act shows that the
conference report, which was afterwards enacted by Congress, 4 adopted
the Senate's views with respect to employee suits and jurisdiction. The
sections of the original bill providing for employee suits and vesting in
state courts concurrent jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this act",
obviously were designed to afford workers an effective remedy for the
enforcement of their right. The House rejected the provision for employee suits altogether and thereby, of course, rejected as well the provision for concurrent jurisdiction over them. The conference committee restored the employee suits, and, it is submitted, restored with them
3281 Co xG. Rc.. 7957 (1937).

3'83 CoNG. REc. 9158, 9246 (1938).

34183 CONG. REe. 9267, 9178 (1938).
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the concurrent jurisdiction. The concurrent jurisdiction was restored
by the use of the term "any court of competent jurisdiction" as effectively as if the exact words of the original bill were used.
(B) The Three Jurisdictional Provisions of the Act Providing for its Enforcement Considered in Pari Materia, Show the Intention of Congress that State and
Federal Courts Should Have Concurrent Jurisdiction
of Action under Section 16(b).
The terminology "court of competent jurisdiction," is made clearer
by considering Section 16(b) in the light of the two sections providing
public remedies for enforcement. Section 16(a) imposes criminal penalties for violations of the act, but makes no provision for jurisdiction
to enforce such penalties.3 5 Such provision was wholly unnecessary,
however, because the Judicial Code gives the federal courts sole jurisdiction of criminal actions arising under the laws of the United States.38
In providing for enforcement by injunction, Congress in Section 17
specifically limits jurisdiction of such proceedings brought by the United
States to the federal courts.3 7 However, when Congress came to consider private rights and remedies under the act, it departed from the
pattern of Sections 16(a) and 17 and provided for the enforcement of
such rights in all courts of "competent jurisdiction".
Here we have three jurisdictional variations in reference to three
distinct methods of enforcing the act, Sections 16(a), 16(b), and 17.
In view of this it could hardly be doubted that Congress realized the
need for the three different methods of dealing with violators and for
appropriate jurisdictional grants in connection with each. Since employee suits are for the enforcement of private rights, there was no reason for the restriction of jurisdiction over them. Rather there was
adequate reason for the extension of such jurisdiction. To all intents
and purposes, actions under Section 16(b) are suits for wages and as
such are perhaps more familiar to state courts than federal. Such suits
are often for small amounts. Federal courts may be at a substantial
distance from the worker, while state courts are easily accessible. The
procedure in the state court is generally simpler, particularly in the case
of smaller amounts since they can be handled by inferior courts. Then
too, the lawyer with the type of practice that caters to cases of this nature
is more familiar with state courts. Added to this is the fact that in many
states, particularly southern ones, no prepayment of court cost is required, as in federal courts. Thus, there were practical reasons to
persuade Congress that it was desirable that state courts also have
2
'52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. § 16(a) (Supp. 1940).
42 STAT. 635 (1922), 28 U. S. C. A. §371 (1928).
'52 STAT. 1069 (1938). 29 U. S. C. A. §217 (Supp. 1940).
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jurisdiction under Section 16(b). Indeed, to have confined jurisdiction
to the federal courts would often have the practical effect of depriving
the poorer type of worker of the benefits of the act, unless he joined in
a group suit with others, which experience shows to be an uncommon
practice. One of the most important means of enforcing the act would
have been greatly hampered. To circumvent such handicap, Congress
must have used the-term "any court of competent jurisdiction" intending to vest state and federal courts with concurrent jurisdiction.
ACTIONS UNDER SECTION

16(B)

OF THE ACT ARE NOT SuITs TO

INVOKE PENALTIES OR FORFEITURES WITHIN THE MEANING

OF SECTION

256

OF THE JUDICIAL CODE

It is true that the United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction
"of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the
United States".38 However, the liability imposed by Section 16(b) in
an amount equal to the unpaid wages due the employee is not a penalty
but is designed to redress the private injury done to the worker. The
term "penalties and forfeitures" as used in Section 371 of the Judicial
Code"9 has acquired a narrow and technical meaning by interpretation
of the Supreme Court. Since the term appears in several federal statutes, an examination of them and their construction will prove helpful
in defining the exact limits of this phrase. For example, it is provided:
"No suit or prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture ... accruing under
the laws of the United States shall be maintained . . .unless the same
was commenced within five years from the time when the penalty or
forfeiture accrued. . . .
In Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R.,
the Supreme Court said with respect to this provision: "The words
'penalty and forfeiture' in this section refer to something imposed in a
punitive way for an infraction of a public law and do not include a
liability imposed solely for the purpose of redressing a private injury,
even though the wrongful act be a public offense and punishable as
such."4 1 Was not Section 16(b) enacted for the purpose of redressing
a private injury? Further, the Supreme Court has held the triple damages recoverable in a civil action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
not to be a penalty under the same statute of limitations as to penalties
arid forfeitures above referred to. 42 The double liability imposed by
statute upon stockholders of national banks was held not a penalty. 43
"842 STAT. 635 (1922), 28 U. S.C. A. §371 (1928).
"4

Ibid.

"REV. STAT. 1047 (1875), 28 U. S.C.A. §791 (1928).
41236 U. S. 412, 423, 35 Sup. Ct. 3,28, 332, 59 L. ed. 644, 654 (1915).
4

Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 27 Sup. Ct.

65, 51 L. ed. 241 (1906).
41McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 25 Sup. Ct. 410, 49 L. ed. 702 (1905).
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Now, it must be presumed that Congress was acquainted with the construction of the term "penalty and forfeiture" at the time it enacted
the Fair Labor Standards Act.44 It is manifest, therefore, that Congress advisedly used the term "liquidated damages" in describing the
double wages recoverable from the employer. The use of that term
rather than the term "penalty" shows that Congress intended to impose
liability for double wages solely for the purpose of compensating the
employee for the private injury suffered. The denomination of the
extra compensation as "liquidated damages" should itself be conclusive.
This reasoning is strengthened by the fact that in Section 16(a) Congress provides criminal penalties for violations of the act.
A state statute creating a private right of action and fixing a measure
of recovery -different from and greater than the common law affords a
private remedy to a person injured. Therefore, it can be enforced in
the courts of other states, if not contrary to their public policy.45 A
close analogy to Section 16(b) on this point is the statute which provides that when the master or owner of a vessel refuses to make payment in the manner provided by the statute regulating the wages of
seamen, he shall pay a sum equal to two day's pay for each day during
which pay is delayed. 40 The jurisdiction of state courts of actions under
this section has never been denied. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the
New York Court of Appeals, stated: "Congress has expressly said that
the extra compensation, when due, 'shall be recoverable as wages'. This
would seem decisive, without more, that in determining the bounds of
jurisdiction it is not to be classified as a penalty. There was no thought
that state courts, which have undoubted jurisdiction to give judgment
for wages in the strict sense, should be shorn of jurisdiction to give
judgment for the statutory incidents. This conclusion is fortified when
we search for the purpose of the statute. The purpose or at least the
predominant one, was, not punishment of the master or owner, but
compensation to the seamen. . . . 'How much this extra amount should
be would often be a troublesome question if it were left open in every
case. Hence it might be deemed advisable to have this indefinite element
made definite by general law with reference to which the parties may
conclusively be presumed to have contracted, and which therefore should
be taken to be the law of the contract'. ' 47 The logic and validity of this
" It is a well-settled rile of construction that language used in a statute which
has a settled and well-known meaning, sanctioned by judicial decision, is presumed
to be used in that sense by the legislative body. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 81 L. ed. 7891 (1937); Kepner v. United
States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 49 L. ed. 114 (1904).
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S.657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. ed. 1123 (1892).
"38 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. §596 (1928).
,TCox v. Lykes Bros., 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 226 (1924).
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decision has never been questioned and the case has been cited with
48
approval by the United States Supreme Court.
No essential difference is perceivable between the act involved in
the above case and Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of state courts under Section 16(b) is even
more clear than in the act involved in the New York case. The statute
defining the rights of seamen is silent on the question of jurisdiction, but
in Section 16(b), Congress has specifically authorized suit "in any
court of competent jurisdiction".
Even assuming the liability for extra compensation imposed by
Section 16(b) of the act to be a penalty, it by no means follows that
the question of jurisdiction of state courts to enforce such liability is
determined by Section 256 of the Judicial Code. A penalty imposed by
federal statute may be enforced in the state courts where jurisdiction
is granted by Congress.4" It may well be argued that Congress made
such a grant of jurisdiction by the words "in any court of competent
jurisdiction".
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing analysis, it seems apparent that Congress intended to give jurisdiction to both state and federal courts. Not only
is this conclusion indicated by the sounder legal reasoning but also by
practical considerations. Since the correct interpretation of this phase
of the act is of utmost importance in securing the uniformity which is
necessary to its effectual enforcement, it is hoped the courts will take
cognizance of the many reasons existing for their jurisdiction, whether
they be state or federal courts.
WARREN S. REESE, JR.
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